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«Justice is the first virtue of social institutions,




1 It is 1561, the Republic of Genoa judicially concludes a dramatic series of events that
happened about fourteen years before. Filippo Casoni3, a century later, describes the year
1547 as  grieved by atrocissimi  accidenti:  citizens’  plots,  princes’  conspiracies,  subjects’
disloyalties, changes in the law, councils’ conflicts and private nuisances and rivalries
ruled; fear and danger reigned and liberties were at stake. One event especially marks
that year: the plot of the Fieschi4.
2 The malcontent has long roots and has one of its seeds in the institutional reform of 1528,
with which Andrea Doria and Sinibaldo Fieschi sanction a compromise between the old
and the new aristocracy in Genoa5. The Doria family, asientists6 of galleys, represents the
mercantile and cosmopolitan vocation of the town. The Fieschi family, owners of one of
the biggest Italian fiefs, represents the landed aristocracy.
3 The death of Sinibaldo Fieschi in 1532 jeopardises the agreement and determines the
progressive  marginalisation  of  the  feudatories  from  the  town  politics  and  the
strengthening  of  alliances  between bankers  and shipowners.  All  the  people  who are
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
1
dissatisfied by this course of political events gather around Gian Luigi Fieschi who is able
to attract, to his cause, not only the anti-government Genoese faction, but also certain
foreign powers, France and the Papal States, which aspire to ‘rescue’ Genoa from Spanish
control and subdue it to their own. In January 1547, such a composite group, led by Gian
Luigi  Fieschi,  tries  to  overthrow  the  government  of  Andrea  Doria.  The  uprising  is
unsuccessful and the repression is unmerciful: the body of Gian Luigi Fieschi, who fell
into the sea while crossing a gangplank between two galleys and drowned, is fished out of
the water and put on public view in the dockyard, the Fieschi town residence and their
castle  in  Montoggio  are  razed to  the  ground.  In  1548 the  last  of  the  Fieschi  family,
Scipione,  together  with his  brother-in-law,  Giulio  Cybo,  again tries  to  overthrow the
government of Andrea Doria. The revolt is stifled from the very outset, Cybo is captured
and killed, while Scipione manages to flee over the border.
4 In Genoa an inquisitorial proceeding is started in Scipione’s absence with the charge of
lese-majesty7 against the emperor, the Genoese government being faithful to the Spanish
crown. The trial, started in March 1550, is entrusted to a judge delegated by the emperor
Charles V, a certain Gomez Suarez Figueroa who is the Spanish ambassador to Genoa. The
intervention of the emperor Charles V in the judicial proceeding – intervention required
and  strongly  demanded  by  Andrea  Doria –  contextualises  the  conflict  in  a  different
environment. From struggle between two rival factions for the domination of the Genoese
Republic, it becomes crime of lese-majesty against the emperor to whom Genoa is faithful.
The trial ends in 1552 with a verdict of guilty. Scipione cannot go back to his homeland
otherwise the death sentence will be executed, he is deprived of all his rights, fiefs and
privileges.  The dismemberment of the vast feudal possessions of the Fieschi family is
completed and Scipione takes residence at the French court.
5 The  peace  treaty  of  Cateau-Cambrésis,  signed  in  1559  between  France  and  Spain,
mentions Scipione Fieschi and entitles him to claim his feudal estates against those who
own them at the time8. Ferdinand I, who succeeds Charles V in 1558, pardons Scipione
and re-invests him with his former fiefs. In 1562, Scipione starts a legal action against the
Genoese Republic at the imperial court of Prague, declares to have been badly judged,
proclaims his innocence for the crime of lese-majesty and raises thirty-three exceptions
of voidness against the judgment which has already passed in rem judicatam,  with the
purpose of having the sentence declared null and void.
6 The Genoese Republic submits the petition and the exceptions of voidness to the most
eminent  jurists  of  the time for  examination,  among them there are Ioannis  Nervius,
Ioannis Cephalus, Tiberius Decianus, Jacobus Menochius and the College of jurisconsults
of  Padua9.  The  jurists’  responsa,  given between 1571  and 1572,  substantially  agree  in
dismantling the defensive castle built by Scipione Fieschi’s lawyers and invite the judges
to reject the petition and the exceptions of voidness raised by Scipione.
7 The responsa, given by the most authoritative jurisconsults: Decianus10 and Menochius11,
are mainly made up of two parts: one which pertains to the fact and is directed towards
ascertaining the existence, in the case, of the crime of lese-majesty; the other regarding
the  judicial  proceeding,  and,  therefore,  aimed  at  verifying  the  existence  in  it  of
procedural errors which may produce a null-and-void sentence. The latter is indeed the
part taken into consideration in this research.
8 Res  judicata and voidness  are  the  two threads  with which Decianus  and Menochius’s
consilia are woven. The pattern that emerges from the weaving tells us the story of the
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political and social dynamics which underlie the legal discipline of res judicata and null
and void judgment in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries.
9 Once the phase of the open conflict has ended, it is by means of the judicial proceeding
that things are settled. Scipione’s extreme attempt at having the judgment declared null
and void can be read as a sort of  opinion poll.  Scipione puts out feelers in order to
evaluate his possibilities of going back to his homeland.
10 The choice of the judges, in 1574, to keep the res judicata firm is not only a judicial choice,
it is above all a political choice and is a clear answer for Scipione. A complex balance
between judicial and political reasons characterises every trial. The rules that govern the
procedure have a certain margin for interpretation and often produce results in tune
with the orientation of the political establishment.
11 In  the  Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries,  the  process  of  publicization of  criminal
justice strengthens the authority of the res judicata12 which becomes a ruling instrument
and a tool with which parties’ capacity to settle a dispute is taken away.
12 Starting  from  the  definition  of  res  judicata as  the  irrevocable  end  of  a  correctly
constructed judicial  proceeding we will  investigate  that  which,  in  the  Sixteenth and
Seventeenth centuries, gives substance to it. We will see what the differences are between
final judgment and res judicata and the relationship between appeal and res judicata. Then
we will examine the elements which constitute the authority of the res judicata and the
iuris et  de iure presumption which gives it foundation. Finally,  we will  investigate the
errors that can make the judgment null and void and, therefore, produce the rescission of
the res judicata.
13 This well  ordered research path presents a problematical  aspect,  connected with the
inquisitorial trial and the res judicata,  represented by the truth. Truth and res judicata
could  indeed  diverge.  As  we  will  see,  such  possible  dichotomy  creates  a  number  of
challenging questions and produces, a lively doctrinal debate concerning the conscience
of the judge and the behaviour he has to retain in case the evidence he has gathered
during the judicial proceeding clashes with the truth of the facts which he knows through
personal knowledge.
14 In criminal justice, since life, freedom, goods and fama of the accused are at stake, the
search for the truth assumes a particular political value and is connected to questions of
political opportunity, such as the protection of the established social order. Therefore the
procedural  choices not only have an epistemological  value but also an historical  and
political one13.
 
Res judicata and final judgment
15 Settlements,  reconciliation,  peace-making  and  the  res  judicata all  have  one  thing  in
common: all  determine pacification of the parties in conflict,  and all mend the social
fracture produced by a crime. In the Thirteenth century, once a crime is committed, the
victim can seek satisfaction by revenge, but this practice is strongly contrasted by the
public authority because it produces disorder and law breaking, so the injured party is
instead encouraged to begin a peace-making procedure with the help of mediators, and/
or to start an accusatory criminal trial against the offender. The party’s choice of the
most convenient path to follow is determined by social, economic and political reasons. In
the coming centuries this great power of option is destined to be gradually taken away.
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The story of such subtraction concerns the history of European criminal justice for a
period of about three hundred years and is linked to the steady passing from a form of so-
called “negotiated” criminal justice (based on settlements between offender and victim),
to a form of criminal justice properly named “hegemonic”, that is, coming ex officio14 from
a public judicial apparatus15.
16 “Hegemony” is  a  well  known category in social  history and was first  highlighted by
Gramsci in his Quaderni dal carcere. It indicates a model of power and «encapsulates the
notion  that  the  power  of  a  ruling  class  [is]  exercised  less  by  coercion  than  by  its
intellectual  and moral  capacity to win the consent of  the mass of  the population.  …
Especially  important  for  Gramsci  [is]  the transition in early modern Europe from an
aristocratic society, where the political class [is] kept aloof by an effective caste system,
to a capitalist society, in which a bourgeois state actively [seeks] to mobilise society as a
whole in support of its aims and projects»16. Sbriccoli, a fine expert in Gramsci’s work,
uses the category of hegemony in order to describe the phenomenon of publicization of
criminal justice in the early modern period and frames it within the legal and judicial
system.
17 At  the  beginning  of  the  Fourteenth  century  a  strong  character  of  publicization  is
impressed  onto  the  criminal  justice  system.  Town  governments  become  aware  that
criminal justice is a decisive ruling instrument and therefore it cannot be left to the sole
initiative of the victims. Judges prosecute crimes and convict the offender, even if the
victim, having been negotially satisfied, has reconciled with him and has no more interest
in  the  judicial  proceeding17.  In  the  Sixteenth  century,  between  the  offence  and  the
satisfaction of the injured parties, between the crime and the re-establishment of public
order, the res judicata interposes. This is regulated by principles included in the Corpus
Iuris Civilis18 and in the compilations of canon law19, but especially by doctrinaire works
which flowered all around them. The value given to the res judicata is a possible indicator
of the degree reached by the process of criminal justice publicization.
18 The analysis of the elements that in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries constitute
such value may, perhaps, allow us to provide a contribution for the theory that postulates
the affirmation of hegemonic criminal justice.
19 Before entering into the heart of the matter, it is necessary to provide certain definitions
in order to establish sound points of reference.
20 As for the definition of res judicata, not only have criminal law jurists been used but also
jurists that are concerned with civil law, in that, throughout the Sixteenth and part of the
Seventeenth century,  criminal  law borrows  civil  law categories  to  construct  its  own
institutions20.
21 When jurists define res judicata,  they distinguish it from the final judgment21.  By final
judgment, they mean a decision of the judge that defines and concludes the main subject
of the case and that, therefore, necessarily contains words of acquittal or conviction22.
Yet, the res judicata presents something more, an added value, if compared with the final
judgment pronounced by the judge: the judgment passes in rem judicatam23 following ten
days,  during which time, making an appeal is permitted24.  The ten days given to the
parties  to  appeal,  are  provided  for  by  a  principle  of ius  commune and  represent  a
necessary break between trial and judgment, on the one hand, and the res judicata, on the
other. A pause that allows the parties to evaluate the work done by the judge and its
results, as well as to identify possible reasons for appealing. The appeal,  as far as ius
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commune is  concerned,  is  not  permitted  in  only  two  cases:  when  the  accused  has
confessed of his own free will and when the crime is notorious25.
 
Appeal and res judicata
22 In  the  Sixteenth  century26 numerous  statutes  and  customs  of  the  towns  within  the
German27 and Italian28 territories forbid appeal in criminal cases.
23 The Constitutio Criminalis Carolina29 (hereafter ‘CCC’), promulgated by Charles V in 1532,
absorbs such a rule, and makes no provision for appeal in criminal decisions30. However,
article  1  of  the  CCC establishes  the  quaerela (which might  be  rendered as  ‘claim’  or
‘petition’) to the emperor as a remedy in the case of unskilfulness, negligence or bribery
of  the  judge,  and more generally  speaking,  in  all  cases  concerning denial  of  justice.
Against unjust judgment, only the restitutio in integrum remains. Charles V urges caution
to all his judges, especially to those of the lower courts, who have to transfer the judicial
acts, in all dubious cases, to the colleges of jurisconsults of the great German faculties of
law or to the higher courts (article 219 of the CCC)31.
24 Locally throughout Germany, different customs concerning the right of appeal survive.
There are areas where appeal of criminal decisions is allowed. Brunnemann32 states that
in the Brandenburg courts, appeal is permitted also in inquisitorial trials and Berlich33
sustains the same for the courts of Saxony. However the rules concerning the appeal
within the German regional principalities represent a more complicated problem than
what could be envisaged at the outset, and if we examine, in greater detail, Saxony for
example,  we  find  out  that  the  landscape  is  much more  varied.  Theodoricus34,  while
talking of the courts of Saxony, explains that the dichotomy between what is established
in imperial constitutions and what is locally practised is due to the fact that the laws of
the empire, above all, apply to the Reichskammergericht, and they cannot, and must not, be
extended to the lower courts. He then goes on to specify that such a general, imperial
norm, which does not allow for appeal in criminal cases, is linked to the inquisitorial trial
in which the judge proceeds ex officio against the criminal, and which aims, mainly, at
obtaining a confession from the defendant. He then concludes that, in those cases where
an ‘ordinary’ – meaning ‘accusatory’ – trial is instead brought against a criminal, such
imperial  norm  must  not  be  observed,  because  the  denial  of  appeal  outside  the
Reichskammergericht is considered an extremely severe rule.
25 Carpzov, an eminent Saxon criminalist, seems to have a similar position: he affirms the
right to appeal in criminal accusatory trials and denies it in criminal inquisitory trials.
However,  unlike  Theodoricus,  he  is  aware  of  the  growing  diffusion  of  the  criminal
inquisitory  model  also  in  the  lower  courts35 and  he  is  really  concerned  about  the
professional and personal qualities of the judges that sit in Saxon criminal courts. He
describes them as cruel and easily seduced by money, to which features he adds the
inexcusable lack of knowledge of criminal law and constitutions for the judges of the
lower courts36. Therefore, Carpzov considers the transmission of the judicial acts to the
colleges of jurisconsults of the great German faculties of law or to the higher courts
provided for by article 219 CCC, a necessary part of the inquisitorial trial37. According to
the  jurist,  even  when  the  judge  is  honest  and  expert  the  transmission  of  acts  is
indispensable, because it cannot be accepted that criminal cases which deal with men’s
goods, fama and life undergo only one degree of adjudication 38.  For the same reasons
expressed above, Carpzov holds that in the criminal inquisitory trial the defence of the
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inquisitus has to be admitted, if indeed he cannot appeal against a conviction, he should be
able to prove his innocence and the execution of the sentence has to be suspended39.
26 The rule that forbids appeal is widespread in the Courts of the Italian States, but it is
often criticised and in certain areas is not followed or is substituted by other remedies.
The appeal, according to Clarus40, concerns the right of defence that is part of the rights
that naturally belong to each man and that, therefore, cannot be taken away from him by
laws and statutes. However, the situation with which the jurist does his sums is quite
different, and as he himself admits, in the Duchy of Milan, the laws in force at the time do
not allow for making an appeal against criminal decisions. In the Princedom of Piedmont
and Savoy, Menochius affirms that, even though making an appeal in criminal cases is not
permitted,  however  re-hearing  of  the  trial  is  allowed41.  Farinacius  refers  that  in  his
everyday experience in Rome Papal courts, appeal is forbidden in criminal cases only
when they deal with certain atrocious crimes, and solely if those crimes are fully proved,
or if the defendant has been caught in flagrant delict or has given a full confession. In the
other cases the appeal must be provided for, because the atrocity of the crime is not a
sufficient reason for its removal42. Baiardus in his Additiones to Clarus’ Pratica criminalis,
states that, as far as he could observe, it is forbidden to make an appeal against a sentence
for murder in the Kingdom of Naples, however in practice the rule is not followed, instead
ius commune is applied which permits the right of appeal43.
27 The appearance of rules that forbid appeal in criminal cases, has definitely something to
do  with  the  progressive  expansion  of  the  inquisitorial  model  in  the  judicial  courts
throughout  Germany  and  Italy  and  meets  strong  criticism  and  resistance  to  its
application. The elimination of the right of appeal indeed satisfies criminal policies which
intend to put the problem of the causes’ length right44, but at the same time it sacrifies
one of the guarantees that are provided for the convicted45.
28 Moreover, the morphology of the res judicata is modified by the lack of providing for
appeal in criminal decisions. It is no longer necessary that the time for appeal has clapsed
as far as the passing in rem judicatam of the judgment is concerned. Final judgment and res
judicata almost end up coinciding. The execution of the criminal sentence, usually delayed
at  the  time  of  passing  in  rem  judicatam,  may  be  started  immediately,  following  its
rendition. Certain authors of criminal practices, aware of the dangers that may derive
from that, provide for a series of cases which, should they come about, lead to respite of
the execution46. Among these, for example, there is that of the judgment which sentences
to a more serious punishment than the one usually imposed, in such a case the execution
may be respited for 30 days47.
 
The authority of the res judicata
29 In the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, the res judicata is conceived as a rule and
therefore presents normative and executive characters.
30 The res judicata, as can be read in the Tractati and in the Practicae of ius commune jurists, is
a particular rule in that it concerns only the parties and has legal force between them48.
The parties, therefore, have to conform to it and will bear all effects deriving from it. The
res judicata can produce effects towards third parties only in certain, well determined
cases49.
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31 The res judicata can, at times, assume the status of general rule, when the authority of the
court  which  renders  the  judgment  engraves  this  character  into  it.  The  judgments
rendered by the prince, the Pope or the emperor50, but also by certain supreme courts51
possess this character.
32 The normative  nature  of  the  res  judicata reflects  some indirect  consequences  on the
activity of those who make the law. The power to produce rules of the prince and of town
councils,  even  though  it  is  not  limited  by  what  is  established  by  the  res  judicata,
nevertheless cannot produce effects upon it: that is following and contrary decrees or
statutes cannot be opposed to it52. The power of judging of magistrates is limited by the
res judicata: in a positive way, in as much as judges often pronounce in accordance with a
previous res judicata in those cases with a certain analogy to it; and, in a negative way, in
as much as magistrates cannot judge the same case between the same two parties. As far
as the former limitation is concerned, we can point out that in the early modern period in
Italy and Germany there is no principle similar to the English rule which imposes respect
for the precedent. Nevertheless, certain law courts develop their own stylus iudicandi, the
usus fori are commonly followed and collections of the decisiones of the great law courts
spread53. As far as the second limitation is concerned, the exceptio rei judicatae is linked to
it and is established for the protection of the ne bis in idem principle. Jurists agree in
maintaining that the magistrate cannot judge a particular crime where the following
conditions come to light:  the existence of  a  judgment passed in  rem judicatam which
concerns the same fact, the same parties and the same case, for the reason that the same
petitum cannot  have  two  rendered  judgments  which  are  both  valid 54.  The  second
judgment is necessarily null and void55 even in the case where it has been pronounced
with the consensus of both parties56.
33 «Validiora tamen sunt prioris sententiae presidia: nam et auctoritate rerum judicatarum
fortissime defenditur» (However the garrisons of the prior judgment are most effective:
indeed they are really strongly defended also by the authority of the res judicata), affirms
Matthaeus57 in the first half of the Seventeenth century, confirming that the authority of
the res judicata is a garrison for the protection of the judicial decision and therefore of the
principle of ne bis in idem. Jurists, nevertheless, elaborate an ingenious sophism which
consents  them to get  round the ne  bis  in  idem principle.  Farinacius,  agreeing with a
communis opinio, affirms that it is possible to start a new judicial proceeding against the
same person for the same fact if a qualitas delicti is such that it produces a modification of
the substantia delicti: for example, if the killing of a person is first qualified as murder and
then as parricide58.
34 The normative character of the res judicata produces effects upon the parties’ authority to
settle a dispute.
35 Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-century jurists affirm that a previous settlement between the
parties on the same matter cannot be opposed to the res judicata59. Clarus, for example,
affirms  that  a  custom  which  is widespread  throughout  all  the  Italian  princedoms
establishes that the judge can start an inquisitory trial to prosecute whatever kind of
crime, and it is of no importance if the parties have promoted an accusatory trial or have
settled the dispute already: the parties’ pacification does not and cannot stop the judge’s
inquisitorial action60. Carpzov declares that the settlement between the offender and the
victim  does  not  prejudice  the  public  revenge.  The  party  can  indeed  give  up the
prosecution  of  the  crime  to  his  detriment,  but  not  to  the  respublica’s  prejudice61.
Brunnemann62 agrees with Carpzov, and adds that a settlement with the victim is one of
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the reasons for beginning an inquisitorial trial63. The parties are also not permitted to
settle a matter that has already been judged. Indeed Wesenbeck affirms that since the
right of the parties is made certain by the res judicata, the settlement is no longer needed,
in that there are no longer dubious and uncertain matters which have to be settled64.
Brunnemann  states  that  it  is  not  permitted –  not  even  to  the  judge –  to  end  the
proceeding with a settlement. Once the inquisitory trial is started judges can only inquire,
convict or acquit, because to this purpose have they been appointed65.
36 The  normative  character  of  the  res  judicata is  necessarily  complemented  by  its
enforceability. Once the judgment passes in rem judicatam, perfection, irrevocability and
enforceability are added to it.
37 The  irrevocability  of  the  judgment  is  substantiated  by  not  being  able  to  be  further
modified66 and it opens the doors to its enforcement67.
38 «Et  stante  res  iudicata  non  cognoscitur  amplius  de  iustitia,  vel  iniustitia,  sed  de
executione» (Once the judgment passes in rem judicatam,  justice or unjustice does not
matter any more, only its execution matters)68.  The final judgment of the magistrate,
indeed, defines the case, but cannot be immediately executed. The res judicata plays an
important role in the architecture of criminal justice that is maintained in a cohered state
and may release all of its power thanks to the executive power which derives from it.
39 The jurists are extraordinarily eloquent when describing the effects produced on real life
by the authority of  the res  judicata.  A very impressive description states that the res
judicata makes white become black, and black, white; it makes the undue, due; the non-
heir, heir; it changes truth into falsehood and falsehood into truth. It makes abuse, right.
It is source of law and, therefore, it can make the foreigner a citizen and the Guelph a
Ghibelline, whether it damages or favours the party. Showing great clearness, however,
jurists admit that these changes do not concern the essence of the matter, rather, they
are important as far as the effects caused by the res judicata are concerned 69.  The res
judicata is  indeed unable to change the substance of  goods and relationships,  it  can,
however, reconstruct and feign a different one and make effects leap to the fore from
such a reconstruction.
 
Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur 
40 The  whole  construction  of  the  res  judicata:  its  legal  force  among  the  parties,  its
enforceability  and  the  effects  which  it  can  produce,  stands  on  a  iuris  et  de  iure
presumption70. A character of truthfulness is attributed to the iuris et de iure presumption
against which rebuttal evidence is not admitted71.
41 Jurists72 say  that  if  the  judgment  is  pronounced rite  et  recte,  after  its  passing in  rem
judicatam it is held firm by a iuris et de iure presumption. The truthfulness character of
that iuris et de iure presumption which is at the core of the res judicata is made explicit by
the jurists. They eliminate the intermediate term (iudicatum – praesumptio – veritas) and
establish a  straight  and direct  equation between truthfulness  and res  judicata73.  Such
equation finds its basis in title 17, De regulis iuris, of book 50 in the Digest74. In it, lex 208
relates «res iudicata pro veritate accipitur» (res judicata is assumed as truth). Res judicata
and truth, justice and truthfulness: both equations are part of an absolute knowledge for
which  the  sovereign  power  vouches75.  This  monolithic  union  between  ethical  and
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juridical values is still sound in the Sixteenth century and Iacobus Menochius76 affirms
that the res judicata is not the truth itself, but is held to be the truth.
42 The presumption, which links the res judicata to the truth, creates a virtuous circle in
which every single judgment is a reassertion of the legitimacy, validity and effectiveness
of the whole juridical system. Every single judgment which comes to life, which passes in
rem judicatam,  and which produces  its  effects,  bears  witness  that  the juridical  order,
which generated it, is lawful, valid and effective. Every res judicata which is presumed true
and which reaches the real truth of facts, on the one hand, confirms the good quality of
the procedural law followed by the judge and its good application: the procedural law
becomes the instrument which makes the judge able to reach the truth. On the other
hand, it confirms the good quality of the substantial law applied by the judge and its
capacity to produce justice.
43 The inextricable bond between justice and truth represents the challenging knot in every
inquisitorial proceeding.
44 «Veritas est mater iustitiae» (Truth is the mother of justice) says Baldus77 at the end of
the  Fourteenth  century,  and these  words  become a  communis  opinio still  shared  and
followed in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, as its presence in the Summaries of
law doctrine78 bears testimony. Justice is generated by truth, therefore there is a strong
mother-child relationship between them. Justice can only derive from truth and only in
truth is there justice.
45 In every trial each party has its own truth to assess in order to reach its own particular
justice. This statement challenges the inquisitorial system which is based on the axiom
that there is only one truth. Within this system, judges – who represent the highest social
institution: the res publica,  and dispense public justice – assume the attainment of the
truth as final goal of their judging activity. Good judges, being super partes, can and should
reach the truth. «In iudicando judex debet semper habere veritatem prae oculis» (When
judging the judge must always have the truth in front of his eyes), «Sine veritate bona
non  potest  iustitia  ministrari»  (Without  truth  good  justice  cannot  be  provided  for),
«Iudex ad aliud positus non est, nisi ut veritate tueatur» (The judge is established only in
order to defend truth), «Iudex debet omnibus modis laborare, ut veritatem quaerat et
inveniat» (The judge must work in every way, in order to look for and find the truth)79 are
only some of the communes opiniones related to judges and their duty of achieving truth.
46 The first and most evident occurrence, deriving from this way of judging, is the possible
splitting of the truth itself into two entities that will endlessly try to unify again: the
truth spoken by the judge in the final judgment and maintained firm by the res judicata,
and the truth of the facts, of what really happened. Indeed to tighten up the inquisitorial
judging system, the res judicata – as final result of this system – must be given a value of
truth. «Etiam veritas inducta a lege, prout est res iudicata quae vere et cum effectu pro
veritate habetur, attendenda est et praevalet» (Also the truth induced by law, as it is the
res  judicata,  which  truly  and  effectively  is  considered  as  truth,  must  be  obeyed  and
prevails)80. There is, therefore, a truth induced / produced by law, in that it is the law
which establishes that  the res  judicata has to be maintained as truth.  This  statement
necessarily implies that of the same fact there can be two truths: the truth reconstructed
during the trial and deriving from the res judicata and the truth which we could call the
truth of the facts or historical truth. Between these two truths there can be a dichotomy
which is well known by the jurists, but is denied by the propaganda of the inquisitorial
system. The inquisition tends to reach the truth of the facts81. However between the fact
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and the final decision there is a cognitive emptiness that the judge has to fill by means of
various methods of inquiry: the same body of the accused can become an instrument
which, if properly played, could lead the judge to the truth. Nevertheless in the process of
collecting  and  evaluating  evidence,  a  mistake,  an  error,  an  inaccuracy, a
misinterpretation could occur and the inquiring path could forever diverge from the path
leading to the truth.
47 In 1628 using a beautiful image Harpprecht82 describes the work of the judge comparing it
to that of architects and geometricians. They, using the plumb line, restore harmony,
symmetry  and  proportion  between  unequal  spaces  as  the  judge  restores  harmony,
proportion  and  equilibrium –  where  they  have  been  compromised –  with  an  exact
judgment. The Latin word exactus, as past participle of the verb exigo, carries within itself
the  concept  of  rigorousness  in  measuring,  weighing,  pondering,  evaluating  hints,
circumstances, suppositions, presumptions, proof. Moreover the word exactus finds its
most appropriate use in the field of mathematics and geometry. Theories, which require
the application of a rational method to jurisprudence and which are comprehensively
developed few years later, are coming to light. In 1637, two years before Harpprecht’s
death, in France Descartes publishes his Discours de la méthode in which he affirms that the
mathematical and geometrical method has to be generalised and applied to all human
disciplines in order to reach the truth. In 1667 in Germany, Leibniz publishes his Nova
methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae: a work of great importance since in it there
is  an  extensive  application  of  the  logical  mathematical  method to  law.  The  German
philosopher distinguishes between veritas rationis and veritas facti. The application of the
logical mathematical method consents the veritas facti to identify itself with the veritas
rationis at infinity.
 
Null and void judgment
48 Essential condition for realising the equation between truthfulness and res judicata is that
the  judgment  has  been  pronounced  rite  et  recte.  The  work  of  the  judge  acquires  a
remarkable  importance.  In  order  that  the  presumption  comes  into  existence,  it  is
necessary that he diligently carried out his officium. It becomes, therefore, indispensable
to look at the product of the activity of the judge, the judicial decision, because this is
what gives substance to the res judicata. Around it, problematical knots are tied which
refer to its legitimacy and validity and which can make the res judicata waver.
49 The authority of the res judicata can cease because of the voidness of judgment.
50 The judgment bases its legitimacy and validity on: jurisdictio, jus, justitia.
 
a) Jurisdictio
51 In the second half of the Sixteenth century Gaill declares that the competent judge is
essential part, basis and foundation of the judgment and the res judicata cannot come
from  somebody  who  lacks  the  potestas of  ius  dicere83.  Around  the  first  half  of  the
Seventeenth  century,  Brunnemann  summarises:  «Iurisdictio  fundamentum  est  omnis
sententiae» (Jurisdiction is the foundation of every judgment)84, using a word – iurisdictio
 – which even if it has assumed a slightly different connotation throughout the centuries,
strongly keeps its medieval value and still expresses the power of the judge of ius dicere by
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means of the judgment85. The iurisdictio gives legal strength to the judgment, therefore
the judgment has validity in that it is pronounced by a judge who has the potestas of ius
dicere.  Such  potestas comes  directly  from  the  prince  and  in  an  uninterrupted  chain
transmits itself to the ordinary magistrates of the higher and lower courts and to the
delegate  judges.  The judgment  pronounced by a  magistrate  who lacks  iurisdictio,  has
therefore no foundation and is affected by voidness86.
52 Among the most common exceptions of voidness pertaining to the lack of jurisdiction,
there are those which concern the defect or vices of the delegation of the judge. For
example, delegated judges have to present the rescript of delegation87 to the court, to
which they are appointed, within one year of its granting. Their jurisdiction starts and
can be exercised legittimally only after the presentation of the rescript88. Regarding the
case of Scipione Fieschi, this is the first exception of voidness which he raises against the
res  judicata that condemns him. Charles V grants Gomez Suarez Figueroa an imperial
rescript of delegation the 11th of August 1548, but Figueroa presents it to the Genoese
court  only the 14th of  March 1550.  Not  having been presented within one year,  the
rescript is null. Therefore he cannot exercise any jurisdiction over the case, and the res
judicata is null and void89.
 
b) Jus
53 The  judge manages  the  whole  procedural  course:  from  crime  information  to
pronouncement  of  judgment,  and  therefore  the  correct  application  of  procedural
practices  is  entirely  in  his  hands.  In  order  to  get  a  juridically  valid  judgment  it  is
necessary  that  the  parties  have  been  regularly  summoned,  the  evidence  has  been
correctly secured, the decision corresponds to the criminal charge, is written and read to
the  parties  on  a  weekday  and  contains  clear  words  of  acquittal  or  conviction90.  If
procedural  norms are  not  fulfilled,  the  judgment  lacks  its  substance,  therefore,  it  is
deprived of legal efficacy and is null and void. Scipione’s lawyers complain of: the absence
of defamation and accuser; an invalid citatio(which might be roughly rendered as ‘writ of
summons’); an invalid court appearance of Doria’s lawyer, Hieronymus de Villa; and many
other procedural vices.
54 According to ius commune in order to start an inquisitory trial against somebody, the
investigated crime should be attributed to the inquisitus by public rumour, in short he
should have mala fama. Since it is lacking, an inquisition could and should not be initiated
against  Scipione,  therefore the judgment is  null  and void91.  Moreover the lack of  an
accuser would not even consent the start of an accusatory trial, so according to Scipione’s
lawyers no judicial proceeding could be initiated at all against their client92. In order to
have the judgment declared null and void, they are using rules of the ius commune which
are still formally present in the law system and can still be used to support the party’s
own thesis, but which in practice are overcome by the ex officio judicial proceeding.
55 Scipione not being present, should be summoned three time before proceeding in his
absence. Therefore, because he has not been regularly summoned, the judgment is null
and void93.
56 Hieronymus de Villa does not exhibit his mandate to the court, therefore he could not
stand for the Doria family and all his acts are null and void94.
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57 In  Germany  following  the  end  of  the  inquisitorial  trial  and  before  pronouncing  the
judgment, the judge has to transfer the judicial acts to the colleges of jurisconsults of the
great German faculties of law or the higher courts95. They verify the correctness of the
proceeding and formulate their opinion. The judge is bound to scrupulously respect it,
because it must be considered in the same way as law and must be followed96. This modus
operandi enables rectifying formal vices of the proceeding and complies with principles of
trial economy: the judgment given without following the judicial procedure is indeed null
and  void.  In  Germany  again,  Leyser  refers  that  errors  in  respecting  the  criminal
procedure can drive the judge to define the case with interlocutory judgment instead of
final judgment in order to avoid its voidness97.
58 The judge has to pronounce judgment in accordance with that which is established by
customs, laws, statutes and constitutions of the place, otherwise the judgment is affected
by voidness98. It is an opinion shared by ius commune jurists that the prudent judge should
refrain from stating the reasons for the decision, so as to protect the res judicata from
voidness of judgment: another little trick of procedural economy. Having not expressed
reasons, it is more difficult to single out voidness of judgment that is linked to erroneous
application of laws and statutes99. In the first half of the Seventeenth century however,
certain jurists  from the German area,  who are  sensitive  to  the right  of  defence and
because of exemplariness, ask for the reasons to be stated in the decision100.
59 The communis opinio of the jurists is equated to laws and statutes, when it is confirmed by
laws. In this case as well, the judgment, that opposes it, is null and void101.
60 It is not easy being a judge in the Seventeenth century. The German jurists are aware of
the fact that multiplicity of laws and the manifold variety of communes opiniones represent
a great difficulty for the judges, especially for those of the lower courts, who – not always
being experts of law – have trouble in finding the right law to apply to cases. Jurists
therefore create a doctrinal principle which justifies the judge and lets go unpunished he
who judged badly due to error, unskilfulness or negligence102. Harpprecht goes so far as to
say that in such cases the judgment is not void, but appealable, therefore passes in rem
judicatam and is not amendable any more, if the interested party does not present appeal
within the ten days established for this purpose103.
 
c) Justitia
61 The judge must attain the substantial truthfulness of facts,  in order to realise justice
among the parties.
62 This idea of justice tightly clinging to truth which can be reached through the rightful
work and judgment of the judge, has some of its roots in canonistic science104 and feeds
the  really  lively  doctrinal  debate  on  the  judge’s  rightness  of  judging  according  to
conscience or according to judicial evidence105. Jurists ask themselves how the judge has
to behave whenever he knows the truth: for example in the case in which he knows that
the accused is innocent while the evidence gathered during the proceeding leads to his
conviction. The solution, that some of the jurists single out, is that in such a case the
judge has to transfer the case to a higher court or to the prince106.
63 Judges, otherwise, must abide by the judicial acts and the evidence gathered during the
trial. Jurists are worried by the fact that to let magistrates judge according to conscience
could mean letting them act in the most indiscriminate and arbitrary of ways107. Jurists
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are however aware that the aim of human public justice consists in reaching not the
absolute truth of the fact, but a truth of the fact which is reasonably known to the judge
on the basis of the evidence gathered108. Judges are bound to follow public knowledge not
only as far as the law is concerned, but also as far as facts are concerned109.
64 This picture acquires a greater complexity if we assume a different viewpoint and take
the arbitrium iudicis110, a regulated discretionary power of the judge, into consideration. If
during the trial, the judge has not reached full proof (two eyewitnesses or confession,
according  to  ius  commune)  of  the  fact,  but  he  has  gathered  sufficient  circumstantial
evidence  against  the  accused,  he  can  sentence  him  to  a  poena  extraordinaria,  an
extraordinary punishment111. In this case as well, the truth spoken by the final judgment
and kept firm by the res judicata could hypothetically not correspond to the truth of the
facts.
65 This truth reduced, subject to mistakes is the product of public justice. This is the truth
that men are made to accept and that is kept firm with the res judicata eliminating the
right of appeal.
66 Indeed, as Scaccia correctly says, the defects of the judicial decisions which are related to
justice  give  the  parties  the  right  to  appeal,  while  those  which  are  related  to  the
proceeding give the parties the right to present a quaerela nullitatis112. Once the right of
appeal is eliminated, the parties have lost a fundamental guarantee of theirs, that which
consents the losing party to intervene in order to correct the non-conformity of the
judgment with the truth of the fact.
67 For Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-century jurists the elimination of the right of appeal in
criminal cases determines the problem of the unjust judgment. Some jurists believe that
if the unjustice is manifest, it produces such an error in the judicial decision that it can be
considered like those that render the judgment null and void. Others more rigorously
declare that the unjustice of the judicial decision does not pertain to the substance of the
proceeding and therefore cannot render the judgment null and void113. If new evidence,
which could not be found during the trial for just cause, arises the unjustly convicted
party can claim the restitutio in integrum114. In Germany the prohibition of the appeal in
criminal cases determines an increase of the petitions for mercy to the Sovereign. The
petitions  and  the  mercy  that  often  follows  alter  the  correlation  between  what  is
established in the final judgment and what is executed115.
68 It is common place among jurists that judges – in order to judge well – must have two
different types of salt in their brain: the salt of science and the salt of conscience. If the
first  one is  lacking,  they are  insipid and therefore not  able  to  perform their  duties,
because they are not supported by the knowledge of law. If the second one is missing,
they are diabolic, in that judges who do not conform their judgments to truth and justice
are ministers of the devil116.
 
Remedies
69 The judge rules the proceedings and therefore the delivery of a correct judgment, on
which the formation of a valid res judicata depends, is entirely in his hands. The powers of
the judge and the errors that he can make are two directly proportional quantities. The
greater the powers entrusted to the judge, the greater the number of errors he can make
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117. Great importance is therefore assumed by the remedies that the judicial system puts
at the disposal of the party which suffers an invalid or unjust judgment.
70 Even though Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-century jurists know the distinction between
error in law and error in fact of the judgment118, it is not upon this basis that they build
the theory of the voidness of judgment. As we saw, the voidness of judgment derives
instead from the fact that the error is expressed, manifest119. The voidness can be asserted
notwithstanding the passing in rem judicatam and for a period of thirty years120.
71 The remedy given against  a  null  and void judgment,  that  passed in  rem judicatam,  is
elaborated by late ius commune and consists of the quaerela nullitatis121.  If  the quaerela
nullitatis is allowed, it determines the rescission of the decision122. A considerable number
of jurists suggests that it  is not right to execute the res judicata affected by manifest
voidness123. Together with them, there are those who affirm that the execution of the res
judicata cannot  be  delayed  by  the  excuse  of  its  manifest  voidness,  because  the
presumption of truthfulness lies with the judgment124. It is perhaps not by chance that
these words come from Gaill, assistant judge at the Reichskammergericht in the second half




72 The power of judging and the duty to do it according to certain rules concentrate on the
figure of the judge. The res judicata produces effects exactly because it is the result of the
correct interaction between such power and such duty. The power of judging that the
political order entrusts to the judge is limited by the fact that he has carried it out within
the rules established by the same political order. The widening and narrowing of these
limits have repercussions on the irrevocability – or better on the capacity of not being
rescindable – of the res judicata which, in the most extreme hypothesis, could be valid and
therefore  produce  its  effects  even  in  the  case  where  the  judge  operates  without
respecting the rules125.
73 The res judicata is progressively constructed as an instrument whose purpose is to defend
and keep the judging activity of the judge sound and to assess its legitimacy and validity
against other forms of pacification which intervened between the parties. The res judicata
is presented as the definitive remedy for solving conflicts. Even if private settlements still
exist, they are gradually deprived of authority by the growing importance of the judge’s
decision, of which they are not any more a valid alternative. This great power entrusted
to the judge must necessarily be regulated, and judges have to be careful in wielding it, in
that  they  deal  with  questions  concerning  the  innocence  and  guilt  of  a  person.  As
Brunnemann says, the firmitas of the res judicata (meaning its irrevocability) cannot be
extended to the point of harming the body and the fama of an innocent person, since the
law did not give the judge the power to condemn or make an innocent person infamous126
.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
14
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahsmann, M., Matthaeus II. Antonius (1601-1654) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein
biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995a, p.
415.
Ahsmann, M., Wesenbeck Matthaeus (1531-1586) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein
biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995b, p.
651.
Alessi, G., Prova legale e pena. La crisi del sistema tra medio evo e moderno, Napoli, Jovene Editore,
1979.
Alessi, G., Il processo penale. Profilo storico, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2001.
Ascheri, M.,I «Grandi Tribunali» d’Ancien Régime e la motivazione della sentenza, inAscheri, M., 
Tribunali, giuristi e istituzioni dal medioevo all’età moderna, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, pp. 85-183.
Baiardus, I.B., Additiones ad Iulii Clari Librum Quintum sive Practicam Criminalem, in Clarus, G., 
Liber Quintus sive Pratica Criminalis, Venetiis, ex typographia Baretiana, 1626.
Baldus de Ubaldis, In primam Digesti Veteris partem commentaria, Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1577.
Bartolus a Saxoferrato, In Primam Digesti Novi partem … (commentaria), Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1580.
Beretta, C., Jacopo Menochio e la controversia giurisdizionale milanese degli anni 1596-1600, 
Archivio Storico Lombardo, 1977, III, pp. 47-128.
Bergfeld, Ch., Scaccia Sigismondo (16./17. Jh.) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein
biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995, p.
545.
Berlich, M., Decisiones aureae, Lipsiae, sumptibus viduae Gothofredi Grossi, 1656-1660.
Bertachinus, J., Repertorium, Venetiis, apud Nicolaum Bevilaquam & socios, 1570.
Bettoni, A., Voci malevole. Fama, notizia del crimine e azione del giudice nel processo criminale
(sec. XVI- XVII), Quaderni Storici, 2006, XLI, 1, pp. 13-38.
Birocchi, I., Alla ricerca dell’ordine, Torino, Giappichelli, 2002.
Boero, F.M., Fieschi e Doria: due famiglie per una città, Casale Monferrato, CEM, 1986.
Brunnemann, J., Consilia sive responsa academica, Francofurti ad Viadrum, sumptibus Jeremiae
Schrey Heredorum & Johannis Christophori Hartmann, 1704.
Brunnemann, J., De inquisitionis processu, Francofurti et Lipsiae, sumptibus Ioannis Christiani
Kleibii, 1747a.
Brunnemann, J., De processu fori, Francofurti et Lipsiae, sumptibus Ioannis Christiani Kleibii,
1747b.
Brunnemann, J., Commentarius in Quinquaginta libros Pandectarum, Coloniae Allobrogum,
Sumptibus Fratrum Cramer, 1752.
Brunnemann, J., Commentarius in Codicem, Coloniae Allobrogum, sumptibus Fratrum Cramer, 1754.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
15
Calamandrei, P., La teoria dell’«error in judicando» nel diritto italiano intermedio, Rivista critica
di Scienze Sociali, 1914, I, nn.8/9-12, pp. 373-393, 437-471, 501-540 (now also in Calamandrei, P., 
Opere giuridiche, Napoli, Morano Editore, 1979, vol. VIII, pp.147-244).
Calcagno, D. (Ed.), I Fieschi tra papato ed impero. Conference proceedings, Lavagna, 18 December 1994,
Chiavari, Grafica Piemme, 1998.
Calcagno, D. (Ed.), I Fieschi tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna. Proceedings of the conferences held on the
occasion of the 450th anniversary of the Fieschi plot, Genova, 21 October-2 Dicember 1997, Chiavari, Grafica
Piemme, 1999.
Caroli, P., I manoscritti originali dei Consilia di Tiberio Deciani per la Repubblica di Genova, in
Cavina, M. (Ed.), Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Alle origini del pensiero giuridico moderno, Udine, Forum,
2004, pp. 237-244.
Carpzov, B., Practica nova imperialis Saxonica rerum criminalium, Lipsiae, apud J.F. Gleditschium,
1739.
Casoni, F., Annali della Repubblica di Genova del secolo decimosesto, Genova, 1799.
Cassi, A.A., Testis pallidus. Indicazioni per un ‘giusto processo’ nel Tractatus di Deciani, in Cavina,
M. (Ed.), Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Alle origini del pensiero giuridico moderno, Udine, Forum, 2004,
pp. 141-156.
Cavanna Ciappina, M., Casoni Filippo, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Roma, Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1978, 21, pp. 393-396.
Cavina, M. (Ed.), Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Alle origini del pensiero giuridico moderno, Udine, Forum,
2004.
Christynen, P. van, Practicarum quaestionum rerumque in supremis Belgicarum curiis … decisiones,
Antuerpiae, apud Hieronymum & Io. Bapt. Verdussen, 1661.
Clarus, I., Sententiarum receptarum Liber Quintus, Venetiis, apud P.M. Bertanum, 1607.
Codics Domini Iustiniani Libri IX priores, Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1592.
Constitutiones Papae Clementis V, Lugduni, apud Haeredes Gulielmi Rovillii, 1605.
Constitutiones criminales publicorum iudiciorum Caroli V, in Goldast von Heiminsfeld, M., 
Collectio constitutionum imperialium, Francofurti ad Moenum, ex officina Zunneriana, 1713, tome 3,
pp. 516-560.
Cordero, F., Procedura penale, Milano, Giuffrè, 1985.
Costa,P., Iurisdictio. Semantica del potere politico nella pubblicistica medievale (1100-1433), Milano,
Giuffrè, 1969.
Damaška, M.R., The faces of justice and State authority, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986.
Damhouder, J. (but really Philippe de Wielant), Praxis rerum criminalium, Antuerpiae, sumptibus
viduae et haeredum Ioan. Belleri, 1601.
Daoyz, S., Juris Civilis summa, seu index copiosus …, Mediolani, Sumptibus J.B. Cetti, 1742.
Decianus, T., Responsa, Venetiis, apud Hieronymum & Ioannem Zenarios, 1579, voll. 3.
Decianus, T., Tractatus criminalis, Venetiis, apud Franciscum de Franciscis, 1590.
Decretum Gratianii […] una cum glossis, Lugduni, sumptibus Petri Landry, 1606.
Decretales Papae Gregorii IX […] una cum glossis, Lugduni, apud Haeredes Gulielmi Rovillii, 1606.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
16
De Marsiliis, I., Practica criminalis, Venetiis, ex typographia Bartholomaei Rubini, 1574.
Digestum Novum seu Pandectarum Iuris Civilis tomus tertius, Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1592.
Durand, B., Suspicion et récusation des juges dans le procès pénal d’Ancien Régime, Recueil de
Mémoires et Travaux, publié par la Société d’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays de Droit
Écrit, 1996, XVII (Critères du juste et contrôle des juges), pp. 91-128.
Falk, U., «In dubio pro amico». Lo studio di un caso di prassi consiliare e di trasmissione degli atti
in Germania, Studi di storia del diritto, III (Università degli studi di Milano, Facoltà di
Giurisprudenza, Pubblicazioni dell’Istituto di Storia del Diritto Italiano), Milano, 2001, pp.
389-417.
Falk, U., De la torture judiciaire en Saxe, en particulier chez Benedict Carpzov (1595-1666), in
Durand, B. (Dir.), La torture judiciaire. Approches historiques et juridiques, Lille, Centre d’Histoire
Judiciaire Éditeur, 2002, vol. 2, pp. 709-742.
Farinacius, P., Variae quaestiones et communes opiniones criminales, Venetiis, apud Io. Variscum et
Paganinum de Paganinis, 1589.
Farinacius, P., Praxis et Theorica criminalis, Lugduni, sumptibus Iacobi Cardon, 1639.
Ferrer Beltrán, J., Prova e verità nel diritto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004.
Foucault, M., A verdade e as formas juridicas, Conferences held at the Pontifical Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro, from the 21st to the 25th May 1973, Cadernos da P.U.C., June 1974, 16,
pp. 5-133 (Ital. Transl. Foucault, M., La verità e le forme giuridiche, Napoli, La città del Sole, 1994).
Gaill, A., Observationes practicae Imperialis Camerae, Augustae Taurinorum, apud Io. Dominicum
Tarlnum, 1595.
Garnot, B., Intime conviction et erreur judiciaire. Un magistrat assassin au XVIIe siècle?, Dijon, EUD,
2004.
Griesebner, A., «In via gratiae et ex plenitudine potestatis». Grazia e prassi giudiziaria
nell’Arciducato dell’Austria Inferiore (XVIII), in Nubola, C., Würgler, A. (Eds.), Suppliche e
«gravamina». Politica, amministrazione, giustizia in Europa (secoli XIV-XVIII), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002,
pp. 307-342.
Groenewegen (van der Made), S., Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hollandia vicinisque
regionibus, Amstelodami, apud Joannem Jassonium a Waesberge, 1669.
Guisius, I.A., De syndicatu, in Leyser, A., Meditationes ad Pandectas, Lipsiae, apud I. C. Meisnerum,
1762, vol. XI, specimen 680.
Gunn, S., From hegemony to governmentality: changing conceptions of power in social history, 
Journal of Social History, 2006, XXXIX, 3, pp. 705-720.
Hanard, G., Res iudicata pro veritate habetur: la naissance d’un concept, Cahier du Centre de
Recherches en Histoire du Droit et des Institutions, 1995, 4 (L’autorité de la chose jugée), pp. 15-28.
Harpprecht, J., Commentarius in quatuor institutionum iustinianearum libros, Francofurti, typis
Iohannis Aubry, 1657.
Härter, K., Negoziare sanzioni e norme: la funzione e il significato delle suppliche nella giustizia
penale della prima età moderna, in Nubola, C., Würgler, A. (Eds.), Suppliche e «gravamina». Politica,
amministrazione, giustizia in Europa (secoli XIV-XVIII), Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002, pp. 263-305.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
17
Hewett, M., Hallebeek, J., The prelate, the praetor and the professor: Antonius Matthaeus II and
the crimen laesae maiestatis, Utrecht 1639-1640, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 1998, 66, pp.
115-150.
Holthöfer, E., Claro (Clarus) Giulio (1525-1575) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein
biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995a, pp.
128-129.
Holthöfer, E., Deciani (Decianus) Tiberio (1509-1582) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein
biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995b, pp.
164-165.
Holthöfer, E., Menocchio (Menochius), Jacopo (1532-1607) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen.
Ein biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995c,
pp. 423-424.
Kempis, K.(von), Andreas Gaill (1526-1587). Zum Leben und Werk eines Juristen der frühen Neuzeit,
Frankfurt am Main, Verlag Peter Lang, 1988.
Kleckner, W. H., Tiberio Deciani tra lesa maestà, ribellione e fellonia. (Le congiure dei Fieschi
contro Sacro Romano Impero e alleati), in Cavina, M. (Ed.), Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Alle origini del
pensiero giuridico moderno, Udine, Forum, 2004, pp. 257-279.
Langbein, J.H., Prosecuting crime in the Renaissance. England, Germany, France, Cambridge MA,
Harvard University Press, 1974.
Langbein J.H., Torture and the law of proof. Europe and England in the Ancien Régime, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Leyser, A., De conceptione sententiae, in Leyser, A., Meditationes ad Pandectas, Lipsiae, apud I. C.
Meisnerum, 1744, vol. VII, specimen 467.
Liber Sextus Decretalium Papae Bonifacii VIII, Lugduni, apud Haeredes Gulielmi Rovillii, 1605.
Luig, K., Leyser Augustin (1683-1752) (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein biographisches
Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995, pp. 377-378.
Mancuso, F., Esprimere causam in sententia. Ricerche sul principio di motivazione della sentenza nell’età
del diritto comune classico, Milano, Giuffrè, 1999.
Maranta, R. Quaestionum legalium disputationes decem, in Maranta R. Speculum aureum, Venetiis,
apud Ioannem Mariam Bonellum, 1568a.
Maranta, R. Speculum aureum, Venetiis, apud Ioannem Mariam Bonellum, 1568b.
Marchetti, P., Testis contra se. L’imputato come fonte di prova nel processo penale dell’età moderna,
Milano, Giuffrè, 1994.
Marongiu, A., Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Lettore di diritto, consulente, criminalista, Rivista di
Storia del Diritto Italiano, 1934, 7, pp. 135-202, 312-387.
Massetto, G.P., Un magistrato e una città nella Lombardia spagnola. Giulio Claro pretore a Cremona,
Milano, Giuffrè, 1985.
Massetto, G.P., Sentenza (diritto intermedio), Enciclopedia del Diritto, Milano, Giuffrè, 1989, vol.
XLI, pp. 1200-1245.
Massetto, G.P., La prassi giuridica lombarda nell’opera di Giulio Claro, in Massetto, G.P., Saggi di
storia del diritto penale lombardo (secc. XVI-XVIII), Milano, Led, 1994a, pp. 11-59.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
18
Massetto, G.P., I reati nell’opera di Giulio Claro, in Massetto, G.P., Saggi di storia del diritto penale
lombardo (secoli XVI-XVIII), Milano, Led, 1994b, pp. 61-227.
Matthaeus, A., De criminibus, Trajecti ad Rhenum, typis Ioannis à Waesberge, 1644.
Mayali, L., Introduction, in Gouron, A., Mayali, L., Padoa Schioppa, A., Simon, D. (Hrsg.), Error
iudicis. Juristische Wahrheit und justizieller Irrtum, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1998,
pp. 1-5.
Maynus, I., In primam Codicis Partem Commentaria, Venetiis, Aquilae renovantis insigne, 1590a.
Maynus, I., In primam Digesti Novi Partem Commentaria, Venetiis, Aquilae renovantis insigne, 1590b.
Mazzacane, A., Claro Giulio (voce), Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Roma, Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1982, 26, pp. 141-146.
Mazzacane, A., Farinacci Prospero (voce), Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Roma, Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1995a, 26, pp. 1-5.
Mazzacane, A., Farinacci Prospero (1544-1618), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein biographisches
Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995b, pp. 199-200.
Meccarelli, M., Arbitrium. Un aspetto sistematico degli ordinamenti giuridici in età di diritto comune,
Milano, Giuffrè, 1998.
Menochius, I., De arbitrariis iudicum, Venetiis, ad signum Concordiae, 1590.
Menochius, I., Consilia sive Responsa, Venetiis, apud Io. Antonium & Iacobum de Franciscis, 1609.
Métairie, G., La justice de proximité. Une approche historique, Paris, PUF, 2004.
Miletti, M.N., Stylus iudicandi. Le raccolte di decisiones del Regno di Napoli in età moderna, Napoli,
Jovene, 1998.
Möller, E. (von), Julius Clarus aus Alessandria, der Kriminalist des 16. Jahrhunderts, der Rat Philipps II.
1525-1575, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1911.
Mollerus, D., Semestrium libri quinque, Lipsiae, impensis Henningi Grosi, 1631.
Mohnhaupt, H., Grundlinien in der Geschichte der Gesetzgebung auf dem europäischen
Kontinent von 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert. Ein experimenteller Überblick, Zeitschrift für neuere
Rechtsgeschichte, 2006, 28, 1/2, pp. 124-174.
Mynsinger, I., Singularium observationum iudicii Imperialis Camerae, in Gaill, A., Observationes
practicae Imperialis Camerae, Augustae Taurinorum, apud Io. Dominicum Tarlnum, 1595.
Mynsinger, I., Responsa iuris sive consilia, Francofurti, in officina Poltheniana, 1601.
Mynsinger, I., Apotelesma, Lugduni, sumptibus Iacobi Cardon, 1632.
Otto, J., Carpzov, Benedikt (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein biographisches Lexikon von der
Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995a, pp. 115-116.
Otto, J., Gaill, Andreas (Wort), in Stolleis, M. (Hrsg.), Juristen. Ein biographisches Lexikon von der
Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, München, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1995b, pp. 220-221.
Padoa Schioppa, A., Ricerche sull’appello nel diritto intermedio, II. I glossatori civilisti, Milano, Giuffrè,
1970.
Petracchi, A., Norma e prassi «costituzionale» nella serenissima Repubblica di Genova. I: la
riforma del 1528, Nuova Rivista Storica, 1980a, LXIV, 1-2, pp. 43-80.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
19
Petracchi, A., Norma e prassi «costituzionale» nella serenissima Repubblica di Genova. II:
Modifiche al sistema: «Garibetto» e «Leges novae», Nuova Rivista Storica, 1980b, LXIV, 5-6, pp.
524-564.
Pifferi, M., Generalia delictorum. Il Tractatus criminalis di Tiberio Deciani e la «Parte generale» di diritto
penale, Milano, Giuffrè, 2006.
Pinchard, B., Ricci, S. (Dir.), Rationalisme analogique et humanisme théologique. La culture de Thomas
de Vio ’Il Gaetano’. Actes du Colloque de Naples 1er-3 novembre 1990, Napoli, Vivarium, 1993.
Pistarino, G. (Ed.), Il tramonto dei Fieschi e la caduta del castello di Montoggio. Conference proceedings,
Montoggio, 30 August 1997, Genova, Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere, 2001.
Pozo, L.M., The mechanism of class accommodation in precapitalist Europe: a study in hegemony,
Review, 2006, XXXIX, 3, pp. 227-269.
Raggio, O., Fieschi, Gian Luigi (voce), Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Roma, Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1997, 47, pp. 462-464.
Rawls, J., A theory of justice, Cambridge MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
Resta, E., La verità e il processo, Politica del Diritto, 2004, XXXV, 3, pp. 369-408.
Robaye, R., L’autorité de la chose jugée ou le droit entre universel et particulier, Cahier du Centre
de Recherches en Histoire du Droit et des Institutions, 1995, 4 (L’autorité de la chose jugée), pp. 7-14.
Rosoni, I., Quae singula non prosunt collecta iuvant. La teoria della prova indiziaria nell’età medievale e
moderna, Milano, Giuffrè, 1995.
Savelli, M.A., Summa diversorum tractatuum, Venetiis, ex typographia Balleoniana, 1748.
Savelli, R., La Repubblica oligarchica. Legislazione, istituzioni e ceti a Genova nel Cinquecento, Milano,
Giuffrè, 1981.
Savelli, R., Il problema della giustizia a Genova nella legislazione di primo Cinquecento, in
Bianchini, M. G., Viarengo, G. (Eds.), Studi in onore di Franca de Marini Avonzo, Torino, Giappichelli,
1999, pp. 329-350.
Sbriccoli, M., Crimen laesae maiestatis. Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica
moderna, Milano, Giuffrè, 1974.
Sbriccoli, M., «Vidi communiter observari». L’emersione di un ordine penale pubblico nelle città
italiane del secolo XIII, Quaderni Fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 1998, 27, pp.
231-268.
Sbriccoli,M., Giustizia negoziata, giustizia egemonica. Riflessioni su una nuova fase degli studi di
storia della giustizia criminale, in Bellabarba, M., Schwerhoff, G., Zorzi, A. (Eds.), Criminalità e
giustizia in Germania e in Italia. Pratiche giudiziarie e linguaggi giuridici tra tardo medioevo ed età
moderna, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001, pp. 345-364 (also in Bellabarba M., Schwerhoff G., Zorzi A.
(Hrsg.), Kriminalität und Justiz im Deutschland und Italien. Rechtspraktiken und gerichtliche Diskurse in
Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot).
Sbriccoli, M., Giustizia criminale, in Fioravanti, M., Lo Stato moderno in Europa. Istituzioni e diritto,
Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002, pp. 163-205.
Sbriccoli, M., Lex delictum facit. Tiberio Deciani e la criminalistica italiana nella fase
cinquecentesca del penale egemonico, in Cavina, M., Tiberio Deciani (1509-1582). Alle origini del
pensiero giuridico moderno, Udine, Forum, 2004, pp. 91-119.
Scaccia, S., De sententia et re judicata, Venetiis, apud Paulum Baleonium, 1669.
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
20
Schild, W. (Hrsg.), Benedikt Carpzov 1595-1666. Werk & Wirken, Goldbach, Keip Verlag, 1997.
Schrage, E.J.H, The judge’s liability for professional mistakes, The Journal of Legal History, 1996,
XVII, 2, pp. 101-129.
Schubart-Fikentscher, G., Berlichius Matthias, (Wort), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen
Rechtsgeschichte, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971a, band I, col. 381.
Schubart-Fikentscher, G., Carpzov Benedikt, (Wort), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte
, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971b, band I, coll. 595-597.
Schubart-Fikentscher, G., Harpprecht Johannes Friedrich, (Wort), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen
Rechtsgeschichte, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971c, band I, coll. 2008-2010.
Sellert, W., Gail (Gaill, Geyl, Gayle), Andreas, (Wort), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte
, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1971b, band I, coll.1371-1373.
Spierenburg, P., The spectacle of suffering, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Stryk, S., Usus modernus Pandectarum, in Stryk, S., Opera omnia, Florentiae, apud Josephum Celli,
1841, vol. XV.
Theodoricus, P., Iudicium criminale practicum, Jenae, typis Johannis Nisi, 1671 [anast. Goldbach,
Keip Verlag, 1996].
Thomas de Vius (Caietanus), Commentarii in Summam Theologicam S. Thomae de Aquino, in
Tommaso d’Aquino, Opera omnia, Romae, ex typographia Polyglotta S. C. De Propaganda fide,
1897, vol. 9: Secunda secundae Summae Theologiae: a quaestione 57. ad quaestionem 122.
Tudeschus N. (Abbas Panormitanus), In Quartum et Quintum Librum Decretalium … (commentaria),
Venetiis, apud Iuntas, 1588.
Tuschus, D., Practicae conclusiones iuris, Lugduni, Sumptibus. Borde P., Arnaud L., Rigaud L., 1661.
Valsecchi, C., L’ istituto della dote nella vita del diritto del tardo Cinquecento: i «consilia» di
Jacopo Menochio, Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano, 1994, LXVII, pp. 205-282.
Valsecchi, C., Jacopo Menochio e il giurisdizionalismo tra Cinque e Seicento, Studia Borromaica,
2000, 14, pp. 93-113.
Voet, J., Commentarius ad Pandectas, Hagae-Comitum, apud Petrum de Hondt, 1731.
Walters, D., The significance of the rule res iudicata pro veritate accipitur in the Common Law
and some comparison with the equivalent rules of droit savant, Cahier du Centre de Recherches en
Histoire du Droit et des Institutions, 1995, 4 (L’autorité de la chose jugée), pp. 63-73.
Wesenbeck, M., Responsa iuris quae vulgo consilia appellantur, Basileae, apud Eusebium Episcopium,
1579.
Wesenbeck, M., In Pandectas iuris civilis et Codicis Iustinianei libros commentarii olim Paratitla dicti,
Patavii, typis Pauli Frambotti, 1658.
Zasius,U.,Commentaria, seu lecturas eiusdem in titulos tertiae Pandectarum partis, in Zasius, U., 
Opera omnia, Lugduni, apud Sebastianum Gryphium, 1550, [anast. Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1964],
vol. 3.
NOTES
2. Rawls (1971, p. 3).
Res judicata and null and void judgment in the Italian and German doctrine of...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 12, n°1 | 0000
21
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Concerning Filippo Casoni see Cavanna Ciappina (1978, pp. 393-396).
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8. Kleckner (2004, p. 264).
9. Notices about all the consilia can be found in Kleckner (2004, p. 259, footnotes n. 13 and 15 and
pp. 260-261, footnotes n. 20, 21 22, 24).
10. Decianus (1579, vol. 1, consilium 18, numbers 1 to 288 deal with the exceptions of voidness,
numbers  289  to  393  are  concerned  with  the  crime  of  lese-majesty).  A  detailed  analysis  of
Decianus’s  consilium can  be  found  in  Caroli  (2004)  and  Kleckner  (2004).  Tiberius  Decianus
(1509-1582) is professor of Criminalia at the University of Padua and is consultant in iure of the
Venetian Republic. He writes a Tractatus criminalis renowned for its generalia delictorum,  and a
collection  of  responsa in  five  volumes.  He  plays  a  politically  important  role  in  founding  the
criminal law upon legislation. On Decianus see Marongiu (1934); Holthöfer (1995b); Cavina (2004);
Pifferi (2006).
11. Menochius writes five consilia (1609, lib.  1,  consilia 99, 100, 101, 102, 103) for the Genoese
Republic dealing with the Fieschi case. Consilium 100, to which we refer here, is dedicated to the
matter concerning the exceptions of  voidness.  Iacobus Menochius (1532-1607)  is  professor of
Institutiones at the University of Pavia, of Ecclesiastical law at the University of Mondovì and of
Civil  law at the University of Padua where Decianus is among his colleagues.  His counselling
activity is as important as his academic activity,  and his collection of consilia and  responsa  in
thirteen volumes is widely known and a good help for law practicians. On Menochius see Beretta
(1977); Holthöfer (1995c); Valsecchi (1994, 2000); Birocchi (2002, pp. 244-245).
12. For a comparison between the significance of res judicata in common law and ius commune, see
Walters (1995).
13. Rosoni (1995, pp. 299-311, especially p. 305).
14. Sbriccoli (1998, pp. 245-246) speaks of “proactivity” of judicial apparatuses, meaning that,
when a crime is committed, they have the capacity of “acting” without any further input in order
to guarantee public order and pax civitatis. Sbriccoli borrowed the category of “proactivity” from
Dama£ka (1986, chap. 3) adapting it to the early modern period.
15. Sbriccoli (2001). Langbein (1974, p. 146), agreeing with a thesis of Schmidt, affirms that during
the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  century  «Offizialprinzip  and  Instruktionsmaxime  became
commonplace in Germany; with them Inquisitionsprozess had arrived».
16. Gunn (2006, p. 707). For a definition of “hegemony” in precapitalist Europe see Pozo (2006).
17. Sbriccoli  (2002,  p.  167).  On  the  ‘emergence  of  public  penal  law’  see  Langbein  (1974,  pp.
140-155); Spierenburg (1984, pp. 1-12); Foucault (1994, pp. 79-94). Métairie (2004 pp. 29-30) for
the French kingdom speaks of a proces of institutionalization of justice.
18. Digestum Novum 42, 1 (De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, et de interlocutionibus); Digestum
Novum 44, 2 (De exceptione rei iudicatae); Codex 2, 26 (Si adversus rem iudicatam restitutio  postuletur); 
Codex 7, 52 (De re iudicata); Codex 7, 53 (De executione rei iudicatae); Codex 7, 54 (De usuris rei iudicatae
);  Codex 7,  56 (Quibus  res  iudicata  non nocet);  Codex 7,  57 (Comminationes,  epistolas,  programmata,
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subscriptiones authoritatem rei iudicatae non habere); Codex 7, 60 (Res inter alias actas vel iudicatas aliis
non nocere).
19. Decretum Gratianii, pars 2, causa 35, quaestio 9; Decretales Papae Gregorii IX, 2, 27 (De sententia et
re  iudicata);  Liber  Sextus  Decretalium  Papae  Bonifacii  VIII,  2,  14  (De  sententia  et  re  iudicata); 
Constitutiones Papae Clementis V, 2, 11 (De sententia et re iudicata).
20. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 106, n. 2) openly declares it.
21. Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis, § 7 Quod autem, nn. 16-22); Mynsinger
(1632, lib. IV, tit. 13 Exceptiones, § 4 De re iudicata, nn. 1, 2); Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re
iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, nn. 3-4, 8); Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 2, n. 1).
22. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 1 Res iudicata, n. 6);Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib.
4, tit. 17 De officio iudicis, § 7 Quod autem, nn. 16-17); Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 109, nn. 1,2,3,8);
Maranta (1568b, pars VI Et demum fertur sententia, Decisoria iudicii, tribus membris distinta: nempe
sententia, appellatione et executione, actus I, nn. 1-29); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVII, De sententiae
conceptione, nn. 1, 28); Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 4, n. 1, quaestio 28, nn. 9-12). To the final
judgment jurists equate the interlocutory judgment when it has characteristics which attribute
force of final judgment to it. Usually that is what happens when: «per illam non diffinitur integre
causa principalis, sed per indirectum tangitur, et definitur articulus, qui ad diffinitivam spectat …
quando  per  illam expirat  iudicis  officium  … Istis  duobus  modis  sententia  interlocutoria  vim
diffinitivae obtinet: adde pro tertio modo, si post interlocutoriam non speratur alia sententia, ut
in  absolutione  ab  observatione  iudicii:  aut  pro  quarto  modo,  quando  interlocutoria  continet
aliquid dari, vel fieri» Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 130, n. 6).
23. There  are  different  opinions  on  the  res  judicata and  the  passing  in  rem  judicatam in  the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries. Bartolus a Saxoferrato (1580, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex
1  Res  iudicata,  n.  1)  distinguishes  between  judgment  and  res  judicata and  declares  that  the
judgment is res judicans, that is, it is the act of judging that actively puts an end to the dispute,
while the res judicata is the case itself, which passively receives its conclusion from the judgment.
Therefore, judgment and res judicata are two distinct institutes for the jurist and they come about
at the same time. The canonists take up a different position (at the basis of their opinion is:
Decretales Papae Gregorii IX, 2, 27 De sententia et re iudicata, cap. 15 Quod ad consultationes) and hold
that judgment and res judicata are both the same thing considered at two distinct moments in
time: the judgment is so called when it concludes the case, it passes in rem judicatam following the
ten days’ time for appeal. It is the canonists that elaborate the notion of passing in rem judicatam
of the judgment, who give value and meaning to the time for appeal spent uselessly, and who do
not permit  settlement on the res  judicata.  Between the end of  the Fifteenth century and the
beginning of the Sixteenth, the opinio Bartoli is, once and for all, criticised and laid to one side.
Author of the tranchant criticism which leaves no room for doubt upon which of the two opinions
has prevailed, is Iason Maynus (1590b, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata, lex 1 Rex iudicata, nn. 7-8). The
opinion  of  the  canonists  will  affirm  itself  extensively  among  ius  commune jurists  and  will,
therefore, get the better of Bartolus’s.
24. Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 8); Harpprecht (1657,
tomus 4, lib. 4, tit. 17 De officio iudicis, § 7 Quod autem, n. 21); Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 2,
nn. 3-4).
25. Clarus (1607, § finalis, quaestio 94, n. 1 in fine); Damhouder (1601, cap. 151 De Appellatione,nn.
1-2).
26. Padoa Schioppa (1970, p. 73) points out a tendency to sensibly reduce the application range of
the appeal in criminal trial since the Thirteenth century.
27. Theodoricus (1671, tomus II, cap. X De poenis, aphorismus 5, litera d, n. 55).
28. De Marsiliis (1574, § Opportune, n. 6 circa in medio, nn. 62-63); Baiardus (1626, § finalis, quaestio
94, n. 29).
29. Constitutiones criminales publicorum iudiciorum Caroli V (1713).
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30. The doctrine accepts the principle: Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 1, nn. 27-28);Mynsinger (1595,
centuria II, observatio 98);Theodoricus (1671, tomus II, cap. X De poenis, aphorismus 5, litera d,
n. 55);  Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4,  tit.  18 De publicis  iudiciis,  principium tituli,  nn. 20-21);
Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 139, n. 37). Damhouder (1601, cap. 151 De Appellatione, nn. 3-4),
affirms that the same principle also operates in Flanders.Baiardus (1626, § finalis, quaestio 94, n.
31) sustains that appeal is permitted throughout France. On the appeal in France see Alessi (2001,
pp. 111-112 and all chapter 3: Appello: le grandi ordinanze d’età moderna, pp. 65-118).
31. Article 219 of the CCC entitled: Clarification from whom and in which places advice shall be
sought:  «Since  in  many places  previously  in  this  our  and the  holy  Empire’s  criminal  courts
ordinance the seeking of advice has been spoken of, it is therefore required that all criminal
courts, when they find themselves in doubt as to their criminal procedure, court practices, and
sentences, be obliged to seek advice of their superior courts (Oberhöfe), those from whom they
have  previously  been  advised  according  to  ancient  usage.  Those,  however,  which  have  no
superior  court  shall,  in  cases  in  which the  court  proceeding  has  been carried  out  upon the
demand of a criminal law complainant, seek advice of their authorities who are empowered to
conduct  the  said  criminal  court  ex  officio  and  without  intervention.  When,  however,  the
authorities  ex officio  bring criminal  complaint  or  proceedings  against  a  criminal,  the judges
(where they find themselves in doubt) are obliged to seek advice from the nearest universities (
hohen Schulen),  cities,  free cities,  or others legally knowledgeable there where they think the
information is obtainable at the least cost. And it is particularly to be noticed that in all doubtful
cases not merely Schöffen and judgement-givers themselves, but also anyone who is supposed to
deal with and to advise such authorities in criminal matters, shall take the advice of the legally
knowledgeable without cost to the parties. When, however, a penal complainant has petitioned
the judge to seek the advice of the legally knowledgeable in the particular criminal proceeding
and practice, it shall take place at the cost of the petitioning side. When, however, the master,
friend, or counselor of the prisoner requests for his benefit similar advice-seeking of the judge,
he shall oblige at the cost of the friends or counselor of the prisoner. Where, however, the friends
of the said prisoner are unable, on account or poverty, to bear the aforesaid costs, then the said
judge shall be bound to pursue this advice at the cost of the autorities; but only to the extent he
has not observed that the advice-seeking is occurring intentionally to the protraction of matters
or in order to  create more costs  (which the aforementioned friends or  counselors  shall  also
affirm upon their  oaths);  thus shall  no conceivable effort  be spared,  lest  otherwise denial  of
justice  happen  to  anyone;  for  to  these  great  matters  great  effort  is  appropriate,  because
regarding such transgressions, ignorance on the part of those who ought in fact to know will not
excuse – concerning which judges, Schöffen, and the said authorities shall be hereby cautioned ».
The English translation of article 219 of the CCC is contained in Appendix B of Langbein (1974, pp.
307-308). Appendix B contains the translation into English of all the criminal procedural articles
of the CCC.
32. Brunnemann  (1747a,  cap.  XI  De  contrariis,  quae  contra  inquisitionem  opponi  possunt,  n.  19).
Johann  Brunnemann  (1608-1672)  is  a  professor  at  the  University  of  Frankfurt-am-Oder.  His
Commentarii on the Pandectae and Codex of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis are well known. In 1674
Samuel Stryk, one of his pupils and his son-in-law, publishes the second edition of Brunnemann’s
Commentarius in quinquaginta libros Pandectarum (first published in 1668) adding many leges that
were missing in the first edition. On Brunnemann, please see the incipit of his works.
33. Berlich (1656-1660, pars 2, decisio 231). Matthias Berlich (1586-1638) is a jurist of a certain
importance. He is a lawyer and a professor at the University of Leipzig. His works have a great
circulation in Germany and are often quoted. Carpzov is his pupil and the influence over his
disciple is such that the adage: «Nisi Berlichius berlichizasset, Carpzovius non carpzoviasset» (If
Berlich had not existed, Carpzov would have not existed either) is well spread in Leipzig. About
the life and work of Berlich please see Schubart-Fikentscher (1971a). Berlich’s opinion is shared
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by two other Saxon jurists: Theodoricus (1671, tomus II, cap. X De poenis, aphorismus 5, litera d,
nn. 55 in fine and 56); Mollerus (1631, lib. 4, sem. 34, n. 5).
34. Theodoricus (1671, tomus II, cap. X De poenis, aphorismus 5, litera d, n. 56). Peter Dietrich
(Petrus Theodoricus) (1580-1640) is promoted professor of law at the faculty of Jurisprudence in
Jena (Electoral Saxony) in 1606. He writes his Judicium criminale practicum in 1616. Dietrich is
basically an academic and his Iudicium,  whose style and content are inspired by the Tractatus
criminalis of Decianus, contains the generalia delictorum in its first chapter, accepting – in such a
way – the methodological challenge of Decianus’s Tractatus.  On Dietrich, see the incipit of his
work and Pifferi (2006, pp.188-194).
35. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 107, n. 37, quaestio 139, n. 45). Benedikt Carpzov (1595-1666)
is professor at the Faculty of Jurisprudence and primus ordinarius (president) of the Schöffenstuhl
(Echevin Court) in Leipzig. He was one of the main interpreters of the Usus Modernus Pandectarum
and an eminent criminalist. His Practica nova Imperialis Saxonica rerum criminalium (1635) acquires
great fame and is still printed in 1752. The Practica brings in a milding trend in criminal justice
especially as far as the application of the death sentence in all cases provided for by the CCC is
concerned. On Carpzov see Schubart Fikentscher (1971b); Otto (1995a); Schild (1997); Falk (2002).
36. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 116, nn. 11-19).
37. On the jurists’ debate concerning the controversial role of the transmission of acts in the
German area see Falk (2001).
38. Carpzov (1739, pars 3,  quaestio 116, n.  20).  On the transmission of judicial  acts for other
German regions  see  alsoBrunnemann (1747a,  cap.  VIII  De  defensione  actorum,  membrum 4  De
transmissione actorum inquisitionalium) for the Brandenburg region; Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib.
4, tit. 17 De officio iudicis, principium, nn. 27-28) for the Württemberg region.
39. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 139, nn. 37-41). In the quoted passage Carpzov affirms that
this is what he can see practised everyday in the Echevin Courts.
40. Clarus (1607, § finalis, quaestio 94, n. 3). Iulius Clarus (1525-1575) is a judge in the Senato (High
Court) of Milan and a well known criminalist. He writes the Liber quintus of his Sententiae receptae
in 1568. In it Clarus deals with criminal law, while in its last paragraph he estensively treats the
criminal  judicial  procedure.  He  is  well  aware  of  the  noteworthy  importance  of  the  judicial
precedent in the effective law which does not and cannot consist only in the ius commune and in
the statutes and constitutions. On Clarus see Möller (1911); Mazzacane (1982); Massetto (1985,
1994ab); Holthöfer (1995a); Birocchi (2002, pp. 257-261).
41. Menochius (1590, lib. 1, quaestio 52, nn. 15-16).
42. Farinacius (1639,  pars  1,  quaestio  101,  n.  113).  The atrocious crimes listed in the quoted
passage  are:  violence,  kidnapping,  counterfeiting,  sedition,  lese  majesty,  murder,  robbery,
heresy, simony. Prosperus Farinacius (1544-1618) is a lawyer and a judge of the Camera Apostolica
and Sacra  Consulta.  He  has  an extensive  knowledge of  criminal  matters  –  deriving also  from
personal experience – and an extraordinary ability in defending his clients. His Praxis et Theorica
criminalis (1614)  is  a  huge  deposit  of  argumentations  ready to  be  used  by  practicians.  On
Farinacius see Mazzacane (1995a, b); Birocchi (2002, pp. 267-269).
43. Baiardus (1626, § finalis, quaestio 94, nn. 30-32). Ioannis Baptista Baiardus (d. at the end of the
16th century) gets his degree in utroque iure at the University of Parma and from 1566 to 1569 is
governor of Narni and Spoleto. In 1598 he publishes his Additiones to Clarus’s Sententiarum Libri.
44. Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 42, n. 5); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. I, De processu in genere, n. 26).
45. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 139, n. 38 in fine).
46. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 137, nn. 11-31).
47. See for example De Marsiliis (1574, § Opportune, nn. 6-33); Farinacius (1589, liber I, quaestio11,
n. 62 circa in medio);Brunnemann (1747a, cap. X, De executione sententiae condemnatoriae, n. 6, see
also nn. 1-10); Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 137, n. 18).
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48. Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 8 circa in medio);Gaill
(1595, lib. I, observatio 144, n. 6); Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 267, Res iudicata quando pro veri tate
habeatur, vel non et quae sit ratio, n. 43); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVII, De sententiae conceptione,
n. 62); Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 2, n. 9, quaestio 12, n. 1). On the concept of res judicata as
particular rule see Robaye (1995).
49. Zasius  (1550,  lib.  42,  tit.1  De  re  iudicata,  lex  63  Saepe,  n.  11);  Mynsinger  (1601,  decas  13,
responsum 2, n. 186); Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 8
circa in medio); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVII, De sententiae conceptione, nn. 73-75); Scaccia (1669,
glossa  14,  quaestio  12,  nn.  63-130).  Scaccia  affirms  at  n.  121  of  the  quoted  quaestio that
eventhough the final judgment cannot harm third parties, nevertheless it can cause them certain
damage  because  of  ties  and  dependence.  For  this  reason,  adds  the  jurist,  the  possibility  of
appealing against the judicial decision is provided for on their behalf.
50. Christynen (1661, vol. 2, decisiones 51, 63, vol. 4, decisio 87);Daoyz (1742, pars II, ad verbum:
sententia, n. 56 in fine).
51. Mynsinger (1601,  decas 13,  responsum 2,  n.  124) affirms:  «Adeo ut hodie apud Germanos
omnis illa controversia debeat esse sopita, ac si lege aliqua esset decisa, cum sententia supremi
iudicis ad instar Principis vim et auctoritatem legis habeat». On the question see also: Harpprecht
(1657, tomus I, lib. 1, tit. De iure naturali gentium et civili, § 3 Constat autem, n. 8); Savelli (1748,
tomus 4, § Opinio, n. 4). The question is briefly mentioned in Calamandrei (1979, vol. VIII, p. 170);
and in Birocchi (2002, p. 95). It is extensively treated in Massetto (1989, pp. 1203-1224) and in
Mohnhaupt (2006, pp. 160-164).
52. Maynus (1590a, lib. 2, tit. 4 De transactionibus,  lex 16 Causas vel lites, nn. 3-7); Brunnemann
(1754, tomus II, lib. 7, tit.50 Sententiam rescindi non posse, lex 3 Impetrata, n. 1).
53. On this point see Birocchi (2002, pp. 85-93); Miletti (1998); Ascheri (1989, p. 92).
54. Maynus (1590b, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata, lex 1 Res iudicata dicitur, n. 15); Harpprecht (1657,
tomus 4, lib. 4, tit. De exceptionibus, § 5 Item si in iudicio, nn. 1-5); Mynsinger (1632, lib. IV, tit. 13
Exceptiones, § 4 De re iudicata, nn. 3-9); Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 266, Res iudicata operatur multa et
habes  diversos  effectus,  nn.  7,8,10);  Farinacius  (1639,  pars  1,  quaestio  4,  nn.  1-3);Brunnemann
(1747a, cap. VI, De personis contra quas formanda est inquisitio, nn. 2-9); Brunnemann (1754, tomus
II, lib. 7, tit.50 Sententiam rescindi non posse, lex 1 Neque suam, nn. 1-4);Voet (1731, tomus II., lib.
XLIV,  tit.  2  De exceptione  rei  judicatae,  nn.  1-8).  Brunnemann (1747b,  cap.  XXVII,  De sententiae
conceptione, n. 72) states that the defendant cannot plead against the res judicata if he has been
acquitted for lack of evidence. On the ne bis in idem principle see also Ferrer Beltrán (2004, pp.
67-68).
55. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 63 Saepe, n. 68); Maranta (1568b, pars VI Et demum
fertur sententia,  Decisoria iudicii,  tribus membris distinta: nempe sententia, appellatione et executione,
actus I, n. 119); Menochius (1590,  lib. 1, quaestio 52, n. 2); Tuschus (1661,  VI, conclusio 266, Res
iudicata operatur multa et habes diversos effectus, nn. 7,8,10);Daoyz (1742, pars II, ad verbum: sententia
, n. 46); Brunnemann (1754, tomus II, lib. 7, tit.50 Sententiam rescindi non posse, lex 1 Neque suam,
nn. 1-4);Savelli (1748, tomus 4, § Sententia, n. 23).
56. Daoyz (1742, pars II, ad verbum: sententia, n. 46).
57. Matthaeus (1644, lib. 48, tit.18, cap. 3, n. 7 circa in medio). Antonius Matthaeus (1601-1654) is
professor of law at the University of Utrecht. He writes his De criminibus in 1644. Matthaeus bases
it on books 47 and 48 of the Digest also known as libri terribiles. He interprets the leges contained
in them and adds a concise analysis of the municipal law of Utrecht at the end of every title of
theirs. On Matthaeus see Ahsmann (1995a); Hewett, Hallebeek (1998).
58. Farinacius (1639, pars 1, quaestio 4, n. 4). On the point see Pifferi (2006, pp. 126-143).
59. Daoyz (1742, pars II, ad verbum: res, n. 14).
60. Clarus (1607, § finalis, quaestio 58, n. 1 versic. Sequens, and n. 2 versic. Sed punctus). On the
point Baiardus (1626, § finalis, quaestio 58, additio at Parum prodesset), declares that in the Papal
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States  settlements  are  permitted  only  in  case  of  light  offenses  like  verba  iniuriosa (verbal
offences), pugna (fight). On settlements in criminal matters see Sbriccoli (2004, pp. 110-111).
61. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 148, nn. 1-18).
62. Brunnemann (1747a, cap. VI, De personis contra quas formanda est inquisitio, nn. 12-14).
63. Brunnemann (1747a, cap. IV, De causis impulsivis inquisitionis, n. 38). In the civil proceeding the
intervened  settlement  between  the  parties  allows  them  to  plead  against  demurrer  (exceptio
peremptoria)  during  the  trial.  On  the  point  see  Brunnemann  (1754,  tomus  II,  lib.  7,  tit.50
Sententiam rescindi non posse, lex 2 Peremptorias, nn. 1-4).
64. Wesenbeck (1579,  cons.70,  n.  12):  «Quod ad secundam dubitationem attinet,  videtur  non
potuisse transigi super re iudicata … Nam res iudicata iam certa est per sententiam … Transactio
autem fit super dubiis, non certis … Sed hoc accipiendum est per modum transactionis, ut aliquid
pro remissione detur, … non recte transigi super re iudicata, sicut nec iudicatur, cum nulla subsit
talis remissionis causa». Matthaeus Wesenbeck (1531-1586) is professor of law at the University
of  Wittenberg  and  judge  at  the  local Schöffenstuhl (Echevin  Court).  He  basically  works  on
Justinian’s  Pandectae and  in  1566  publishes  his  Paratitla  in  Pandectarum  iuris  civilis  libros
quinquaginta which, a century later, will be reprinted with Brunnemann’s commentary. In 1576,
he writes Tractatus et responsa quae vulgo consilia appellantur which is the result of his work as law
practician. On Wesenbeck see Ahsmann (1995b).  On settlement and res judicata see alsoZasius
(1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 4 Si se non obtulit, § 3 Ait praetor, nn. 1-5).
65. Brunnemann (1747a, cap. VI, De executione sententiae condemnatoriae, nn. 2-9).
66. Maynus (1590b, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata, lex 1 Res iudicata dicitur, n. 8);Tuschus (1661,  VI,
conclusio 267, Res iudicata quando pro veritate habeatur, vel non et quae sit ratio, n. 57); Brunnemann
(1752, tomus II, lib. 42, tit.7 De re judicata, lex 35 Imperatores, nn. 1-7); Scaccia (1669, glossa 14,
quaestio 2, n. 6).
67. Zasius  (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 56 Post rem, n. 1, lex 61 In iudicati, n. 1); Maranta
(1568b, pars VI Et demum fertur sententia, Decisoria iudicii, tribus membris distinta: nempe sententia,
appellatione et executione, actus III, nn. 1-2); Gaill (1595, lib. 1, observatio 113, n. 16);Wesenbeck
(1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 9);Theodoricus (1671, tomus II, cap. X
De poenis, aphorismus 5, litera g). Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis, § 7 Quod
autem, nn. 23-26). De Marsiliis (1574, § Opportune) indicates the ways that can be followed in order
to  respite  the  execution  of  the  capital  sentence  passed  inrem  judicatam or  which  cannot  be
appealed any more.
68. Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 267, Res iudicata quando pro veritate habeatur, vel non et quae sit ratio,
n.  65);  similarly  Brunnemann  (1747b,  cap.  XXIX,  De  rei  judicatae  executione,  n.  1).  About  the
criminal judicial system established by the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina which does not provide
for appeal, Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 137, n. 1) states that the execution of the sentence
follows the final judgment and cannot be performed if a law order is lacking.
69. Maynus (1590b, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata, rubrica, nn. 1-2);Menochius (1590, lib. 1, quaestio 52,
n. 3); Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 267, Res iudicata quando pro veritate habeatur, vel non et quae sit
ratio,  nn.  54-56,  79);Daoyz (1742,  pars II,  ad verbum:  sententia,  n.  56);  Scaccia (1669,  glossa 14,
quaestio 2, n. 7 in fine); Savelli (1748, tomus 4, § Sententia, n. 34).
70. Rosoni (1995, pp. 158-159) explains that this type of presumptions is called iuris, because is
introduced by the law, and de iure, because the law itself makes them the basis of an indisputable
right.
71. Rosoni (1995, p. 159).
72. Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 8);Gaill (1595, lib. 1,
observatio 113, n. 16); Menochius (1590, lib. 1, quaestio 52, n. 6); Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 267,
Res iudicata quando pro veritate habeatur, vel non et quae sit ratio, n. 10).
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73. Zasius  (1550,  lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata,  lex 55 Iudex,  nn. 13-14); Mynsinger (1601, decas 13,
responsum 2,  n.  126);  Decianus (1579,  vol.  1,  cons.18,  nn.  24 and 46);  Menochius (1609,  lib.  9,
cons.818, nn. 109-110); Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 144, nn. 6 in fine); Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4,
lib.  4,  tit.  17 De officio  iudicis,  § 7 Quod autem,  nn. 21-22);  Tuschus (1661,  VI, conclusio 267, Res
iudicata  quando  pro  veritate  habeatur,  vel  non  et  quae  sit  ratio,  n.  55);  Scaccia  (1669,  glossa  14,
quaestio 2, n. 7 circa in medio); Voet (1731, tomus II., lib. XLIV, tit. 2 De exceptione rei judicatae, n. 1
in fine).
74. For the notion of res judicata in Roman law see Hanard (1995) and bibliography here quoted.
75. Mayali (1998, p. 2).
76. Menochius (1590, lib. 1, quaestio 52, n. 6).
77. Baldus de Ubaldis (1577, lib. 1, tit. 5 De statu hominum, lex 6 Libertini sunt qui).
78. Bertachinus (1570, II, entry: Veritas); Tuschus (1661, VIII, conclusio 166: Veritas attendenda est
semper, n. 17). See also De Marsiliis (1574, § Secunda quaestio, n. 19) and Brunnemann (1704, cons.
ultimum, n. 346). Brunnemann adds that veritas is also basis and foundation of justice.
79. Tuschus (1661, VIII, conclusio 166: Veritas attendenda est semper, nn. 8-12).
80. Tuschus (1661, VIII, conclusio 166: Veritas attendenda est semper, n. 43).
81. «Nam finis iudiciorum est investigatio veritatis» says Brunnemann (1747b, cap. I, De processu
in genere, nn. 25-26).
82. Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis, principium, n. 24): «Et quemadmodum
Architecti seu Geometrae inaequalia spacia seu opera perpendiculo suo ad aequalitatem redigunt:
ita judicem id, quod durius vel remissius est, exacto judicio ad aequalitatem perducere oportet».
Johannes Friedrich Harpprecht belongs to a family of jurists and from 1592 to 1639, when he
died, is professor at the University of Tübingen and eight times its Chancellor. He basically works
on  Justinian’s  Institutiones.  With  the  title  Opera  omnia,  his  Commentaria  in  quatuor  libros
Institutionum Iuris  Civilis is  republished.  His Tractatus criminalis,  whose whole title is:  Tractatus
criminalis aliquot tituli libri 4 Institutionum, pertains to the titles of the Institutiones that deal with
criminal  law and  is  first  published  autonomously  and  then  included  in  his  Commentaria.  On
Harpprecht see Schubart-Fikentscher (1971c).
83. Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 42, n. 9 in fine and n. 10) affirms: «Iudex enim est potissima pars,
basis  et  fundamentum  iudicii.  Baldus  …  iudicem  ducem  et  imperatorem iudicii  vocat.  Et
iudicatum  dici  non  potest  ab  eo,  qui  ius  dicendi  potestatem  non  habuit».  Andreas  Gaill
(1526-1587) belongs to an ancient noble family of Cologne, whose patrimony consents him to
study not only at the university of Cologne, but also at some prestigious foreign universities like:
Orléans and Bologna. Once back in Germany he works as a lawyer in his hometown, from 1558 to
1568 is member of the Reichskammergericht, in 1569 is member of the Reichshofrat in Vienna and in
the last years of his life is Chancellor of the Prince-elector in Cologne. In 1578, he writes the
Practicae  observationes  … which  is  a  systematic  collection  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the
Reichskammergericht. He is basically a law practician and his works are mainly orientated towards
practice, however the original structure of his Practicae observationes … will be a model for future
works in the jurisprudence collection. On Andreas Gaill see Otto (1995b); Kempis (1988); Sellert
(1971).
84. Brunnemann (1754, lib. 7, tit.48 Si a non competente iudice iudicatum esse dicatur, lex 2 Si militaris
, n. 1). Scaccia (1669, glossa 7, quaestio 1, n. 10) refers the brocard in a partially different way. He
affirms  that  «Iurisdictio  est  basis,  et  fundamentum totius  processus,  et  sublato  fundamento,
caetera edificata corruunt».
85. Ius dicere and iurisdictio literally mean – the first in verb-form, the latter in noun-form – ‘to
say the law’. In other words the judge not only states the law finding the rule to be applied in
statutes and customs but also creates it.  He himself is a law source. Concerning the complex
problem of the iurisdictio in the medieval and early modern period we suggest reading Costa  (
1969, pp. 144-153).
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86. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 4 Si se non obtulit, § 6 Condemnatum, n. 2); Gaill (1595,
lib. I,  observatio 42, n. 11);Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 107, n. 73);  Scaccia (1669, glossa 7,
quaestio 1, nn. 10-13). At n. 13 Scaccia affirms that when the judgment is null and void because of
lack of jurisdiction, the voidness cannot be rectified.  He declares that the proceeding can be
affected by three irremediable voidnesses due to the lack of jurisdictio, citatio and mandatum. Of
the same opinion: Brunnemann (1747b, cap. I, De processu in genere, n. 27 circa in medio).
87. A  written  order  coming  from  the  prince  or  the  emperor  containing  the  delegation  of
jurisdiction on the judge’s behalf.
88. Scaccia (1669, glossa 4, quaestio 4, nn. 37-45).
89. Decianus (1579, vol. 1, cons.18, nn. 1-2); Menochius (1609, lib. 1, cons.100, at nn. 7-10 examines
the jurisdictio of  the delegated judges,  while at  nn.  32-36 discusses the exception of voidness
presented by Scipione’s lawyers).
90. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata, lex 4 Si se non obtulit, § 6 Condemnatum, n. 2 and lex 62
Cum quaerebatur, nn. 4-5); Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 267, Res iudicata quando pro veritate habeatur,
vel non, et quae sit ratio, n. 37); Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis, § 7 Quod
autem, nn. 14-19); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVII, De sententiae conceptione, nn. 44-54). The idea
that  the  correct  reconstruction  of  the  truth  can  be  reached  only  by  way  of  a  valid  judicial
proceeding can be envisaged in the quoted passages of these jurists. On judicial proceeding and
truth see Resta (2004).
91. Decianus (1579, vol. 1, cons.18, nn. 38-51); Menochius (1609, lib. 1, cons.100, nn. 58-70). On
defamation as start of the inquisitory trial see Bettoni (2006).
92. Decianus (1579, vol. 1, cons.18, nn. 194-196); Menochius (1609, lib. 1, cons.100, nn. 259-268).
93. Decianus (1579, vol. 1, cons.18, nn. 79-102); Menochius (1609, lib. 1, cons.100, nn. 167-172). On
the  point  see  also  Scaccia  (1669,  glossa  4,  quaestio  4,  n.  4  and glossa  14,  quaestio  7,  n.  44);
Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42, tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 8)
94. Decianus (1579, vol. 1, cons.18, nn. 3-14); Menochius (1609, lib. 1, cons.100, nn. 36-42).
95. Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 107, n. 78). On the matter see also what I say in the § Res
judicata and final judgment.
96. Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis, principium, nn. 27-28).
97. Leyser (1744, cap. II, pp. 297-298). Augustin Leyser (1683-1752) is professor at the University
of Wittenberg and judge at the local Schöppenstuhl. From 1713 to 1748 he edited his Meditationes ad
Pandectas.  He is  interested in Roman law and in natural  law and is  an exponent of  the Usus
Modernus Pandectarum. On Leyser see Luig (1995). On interlocutory judgment see alsoZasius (1550,
lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 55 Iudex, n. 3). The interlocutory judgment can be modified by the
same judge who renders it.  On the matter  see Brunnemann (1747b,  cap.  XXVII,  De sententiae
conceptione, n. 4). Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestiones 4 and 5) throughly explains the differences
existing between final judgment and interlocutory judgment: in quaestio 17 nn. 10 ff. affirms that
the interlocutory judgment can be modified, while the final judgment cannot because with the
latter the judge has completed his duty (officium).
98. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 31 Cum prolatis, n. 1-5). Zasius (1461-1535), a German
jurist who has a humanist background, holds an interesting position on the matter. He, after
stating the general rule which establishes that the judicial decision that is against the law is null
and void, lists some exceptions. The judgment, for example is not null and void if it goes against a
law which has fallen into disuse, or is obsolete, or dubious, neither is the judgment null and void
if the judge explains the reasons why he judged against the law. Zasius refers a case judged by the
Consistory of the Prince in Württemberg, in which the judges decided against a rule of law which
was disused. Therefore, according to Zasius, the judge has also the added duty of verifying the
effectiveness of the rule of law that he applies. On this point see also Brunnemann (1747b, cap.
XXVII, De sententiae conceptione, n. 20); Harpprecht (1657, tomus I, tit.10 De nuptiis, § 11 Sunt et
aliae personae,  n. 109); Maranta (1568b, pars VI Et demum fertur sententia,  Decisoria iudicii,  tribus
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membris   distinta:  nempe sententia,  appellatione  et  executione,  actus I,  nn.  117-118).  Scaccia  (1669,
glossa 14, quaestio 1, n. 6) declares that the law judges the criminal, the judge cannot change the
law, and has the duty to preserve it. The just judge judges according to the law and follows what
is established by statutes and constitutions.
99. Clarus (1607, § finalis, quaestio 93, n. 2) refers what he sees practised in the Milan Senate (in
its function as High Court). Its judges state the reasons for the decision only when the criminal
defaults. At quaestio 85 n. 10 circa in medio the jurist affirms that the reasons for the decision must
also be stated when the judge decides to reduce the punishment established for the crime in the
ius commune or in the statutes. On the point see Daoyz (1742, pars II, ad verbum: sententia, nn. 49
and 58); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVII, De sententiae conceptione, n. 20); Stryk (1841, lib. 42, tit.1
De re iudicata, § 10).
100. Matthaeus (1644, lib. 48, tit. 17, cap. 2, n. 7). Concerning the question of the reasons for the
decision, see Calamandrei (1979, pp. 206-207); Massetto (1989, pp. 1224-1245); Mancuso (1999, p.
218); Alessi (2001, pp. 83-86).
101. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 31 Cum prolatis, nn. 3-4) affirms that the judgment
against the communis opinio is not null and void if the judge can demonstrate that the law is on
behalf of a different opinion, nor is the judgment against a judicial precedent null and void. The
judgment is instead null and void if it is against a judicial precedent pronounced by the Prince.
On the point see also Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4,  tit.17 De officio iudicis,  principium,  nn.
32-39);Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 8, nn. 38-41, quaestio 24, nn. 1-21, pp. 57-58). Scaccia
affirms that the judgment against a communis opinio which is rightly founded is not null and void
but unjust, and therefore appealable. The case is different if the judgment is pronounced against
the communis opinio of the Sacro Regio Consiglio (High Court) of Naples. Indeed its decisions have
the same legal strength of the law within the Kingdom, therefore any judgment which is against
them is null and void.
102. Christynen (1661, vol. 4, decisio 95, n. 5); Groenewegen (1669, Institutiones, lib. 4, tit.1 De
obligationibus  quae ex  delicto  nascuntur,  principium);  Brunnemann (1752,  tomus I,  lib.  5,  tit.1  De
iudiciis et ubi quisque agere vel conveniri debeat, lex 15 Filiusfamilias, nn. 1-2, 6-10); Voet (1731, tomus
I., lib. V, tit. 1 De judiciis et ubi quisque agere vel convenire debeat,  n. 58). Guisius (1762, cap. IV,
pp.46-50) does not agree with the difficulties met by the judge in judging. On the matter: Schrage
(1996) offers an insight in judge’s liability in terms of civil law in France, Germany and England
from medieval law to Twentieth-Century law; Durand (1996) is especially focused on France.
103. Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis, principium, nn. 37-38).
104. Tudeschus (1588, tomus VII, lib. V, tit. De sententia excommunicationis, cap. 40 Per tuas, n. 12).
105. On the debate see Massetto (1989, pp. 1205-1207).
106. Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 42, n. 3) declares that the Reichskammergerichtin that it has a
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the emperor, is not bound to the judicial evidence and can
judge according to conscience. Decianus (1590, tomus I, lib. 2, cap. 14 Conscientiae veritas, n. 19)
agrees and affirms that  the potestas  iudicandi according to conscience is  a  prerogative of  the
prince and of the Supreme Senate. Of the same opinion Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 8, nn.
45, pp. 54-56).
107. Decianus (1590, tomus I, lib. 2, cap. 14 Conscientiae veritas, n. 24) thinks that the judge should
judge according to  judicial  evidence,  but,  at  the same time,  he should not  judge against  his
conscience:  all  that  does not  mean  that  he  has  to  judge  according  to  his  conscience,  but
something different. He has to carry out a series of strategies that consent him to reach the truth
(same chapter 14 nn. 15 ff.). Concerning this matter in Decianus, Pifferi (2006, pp. 336-352) states
that the principle of judging according to judicial evidence is bent by Decianus to the advantage
of the criminal law positivized by the prince and is conceived in such a way as to bind the judge
to the law. Cassi (2004, pp. 148-152) adds that, according to Decianus, the good judge can follow
his conscience if the witness whom he is questioning becomes pale or falters, therefore is not
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trustworthy and a conviction may not be based upon his words. On the debate concerning the
role of the judge’s conscience in his judging activity see also Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4,
tit.4 De actionibus, § 34 Si minus, nn. 2-23). A good synthesis of the debate can be found in Scaccia
(1669, glossa 14, quaestio 8, nn. 1-56). Scaccia in order to support his thesis, which states the
necessity that the judge judges according to the evidence gathered, affirms (in glossa 14, quaestio
8, n. 5 and in glossa 10, n. 25) that the judge cannot be judge and witness at the same time. For
this reason the thesis, that consents the judge who has a direct knowledge of the truth to judge
according to conscience, must be rejected.
108. Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis,  principium,  n. 26); Scaccia (1669,
glossa 14, quaestio 8, n. 17). Scaccia quotes Thomas de Vius (1897, vol. VII, pars IIa, IIae, quaestio
67, art.2, vers. Additur). On Thomas de Vius (Caietanus 1469-1534) see Pinchard, Ricci (1993).
109. Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 8, n. 38).
110. On the arbitrium iudicis see Meccarelli (1998).
111. On the role played by the poena extraordinaria in affirming a «new law of proof» see Langbein
(1976,  pp.  45-60).  His  theories  generated a debate concerning the early affirmation of  a  new
system of proof based on the intimate conviction of the judge. Many Italian law historians (Alessi,
1979, pp. 32-33 footnote 38; Marchetti, 1994, pp. 103-107; Rosoni, 1995, pp. 125-126; Meccarelli,
1998, pp. 250-254) have a different position on the matter, sustaining that the arbitrium iudicis –
used in this case to sentence the accused to a poena extraordinaria – is not outside the old system
of legal proof but is part of it.
112. Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 20, n. 1). Sigismondus Scaccia (1564-1634) is a lawyer in
Rome and a judge at the Genoese Civil Rota. He published, in 1604, his Tractatus de iudiciis in
which he examines some practical questions in order to help the work of the judge and, in 1619,
his De commerciis et cambio.  In 1628, he publishes his Tractatus de sententia et re iudicata which
really corresponds to the third liber of his Tractatus de iudiciis.  On Scaccia see Bergfeld (1995);
Birocchi (2002, pp. 243, 250-251).
113. The following jurists state that the judgment is null and void: Zasius  (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re
iudicata, lex 33 Divus Hadrianus, nn. 4-9); Tuschus (1661, VI, conclusio 267, Res iudicata quando pro
veritate habeatur, vel non, et quae sit ratio, n. 12); Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio
iudicis, principium, n. 40). The following jurists provide for review of judgment: Menochius (1590,
lib. 1, quaestio 52, n. 5); Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 32, n. 3); Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio
139, nn. 38-39).
114. Mynsinger  (1595,  centuria  II,  observatio  25,  n.  1  affirms  that  voidness  and  restitutio  in
integrum can be allowed by the same libel);Menochius  (1609,  lib. 9, consilium 818, nn. 111-117).
Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit. De exceptionibus, § 5 Item si in iudicio, nn. 15-22); Tuschus
(1661,  VII, conclusio 291 Restitutio in integrum datur contra rem iudicatam minori laeso, et maiori ex
clausula, si qua mihi iusta causa, ex instrumentis de novo repertis, et quando secus, nn. 8-9); Scaccia
(1669, glossa 14, quaestio 2,  nn. 8,  45,  questio 32, n.  3).  According to the communis opinio the
restitutio in integrum can be requested within four years from the final decision. See Scaccia (1669,
glossa 14, quaestio 11, nn. 74-79). Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 33 Divus Hadrianus, nn.
4-9)  does not agree and thinks that the decision made on the basis  of  false evidence can be
rescinded ipso iure and for ever. Farinacius (1639, pars 3, quaestio 101, n. 112) holds a different
position and states that against a manifestly unjust judgment appeal must be provided for even
when it is forbidden.²
115. See Härter (2002); Griesebner (2002).
116. Maynus (1590a,  lib.  3,  tit.  1  De iudiciis,  lex 12 [critical  edition 14]  Rem non novam,  n.  1);
Maranta  (1568a,  disputatio  I  An  ordinarius  loci  ad  mandatum  delegati  a  principe  tenetur  exequi
sententiam ipsius delegati evidenter iniustam, et an sibi de facto resistere, nn. 16-17; Menochius (1590,
lib. 2, casus 339, n. 1);  Tuschus (1661, VIII,  conclusio 166: Veritas attendenda est semper,  n. 40);
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Harpprecht (1657, tomus 4, lib. 4, tit.17 De officio iudicis,  principium,  n. 9).  At n. 8 of the same
passage, Harpprecht indicates the qualities which the judge must have with a very long series of
adjectives.  He has to be «gravis,  sanctus,  severus,  incorruptus,  inadulabilis,  contra improbos,
nocentesque, immisericors, atque inexorabilis, erectusque et arduus, ac potens, vi et maiestate
aequitatis veritatesque terrificus … pius, bonus, iustus, aequus, fortis, patiens, benignus, prudens,
constans, verax, candidus, sobrius, liberalis, diligens, secretus, facilis, iuris publici ac privati, nec
non morum, hominum et Reipublicae peritus». We find the same list of qualities which every
judge must have in Scaccia (1669, glossa 4, quaestio 2, n. 60). The jurist at quaestiones 1 and 2
indicates the criteria to be followed when choosing a judge.
117. Calamandrei (1979, p. 156). Garnot (2004) deals with a problematic issue connected with the
judicial error: the relationship between judicial evidence and the intime conviction of the judge.
118. Bertachinus (1570, II, entry: Error iuris and Error facti); Farinacius (1639, pars 3, quaestio 111,
n. 481).
119. Zasius  (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 27 Praeses provinciae, nn. 2-4);Harpprecht (1657,
tomo I, tit.10 De nuptiis, § 11 Sunt et aliae personae, n. 109); Carpzov (1739, pars 3, quaestio 139, n.
39). On the point see Calamandrei (1979, p. 167); Padoa Schioppa (1970, pp. 26-27).
120. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 62 Cum quaerebatur, nn. 10-11); Wesenbeck (1658,
lib.  42,  tit.  1  De re  iudicata  et  de  effectu sententiarum,  n.  10);  Gaill  (1595,  lib.  I,  observatio 127,
n. 8);Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 32, n. 55); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVII, De sententiae
conceptione, nn. 67 in fine and 68, cap XXVIII De appellationibus, n. 108). Brunnemann at n. 109 of
caputDe  appellationibus refers  to  a  practice  that  spread  throughout  Germany  after  the  new
Imperial Constitutions  were  enacted.  According  to  them  the  quaerela  nullitatis should  be
presented in the same ten days that are given to make an appeal. The only exceptions to the rule
are represented by the irremediable voidnesses related to the person of the judge, of the parties
or to essential acts of the proceeding. Certain jurists affirm that the judgment does not pass inrem
judicatam when it  is  null and void:Maranta (1568b, pars VI Et demum fertur sententia,  Decisoria
iudicii, tribus membris distinta: nempe sententia, appellatione et executione, actus I, n. 153); Farinacius
(1589, liber I,  quaestio 25, n. 5);  Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 2, nn. 38-39);  Savelli  (1748,
tomus 4,  §  Sententia,  n.  30).  Brunnemann (1747b,  cap.  XXVII, De  sententiae  conceptione,  n.  67)
affirms that the final judgment does not pass inrem judicatam only if the res judicata is notoriously
null  and void.  Other  jurists  affirm that  during the appeal  presented by the party,  questions
relating to the unjustice of the decision can be treated together with questions related to its
voidness, because they should not be excluded from the appeal case. Once appeal is presented it
is not necessary to present the quaerela nullitatis as well. However if the party failed to appear or
to pursue for a two year period,  he not only loses the case on appeal,  but also the case for
voidness. See: Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 62 Cum quaerebatur, nn. 7-9);Mynsinger
(1601, decas 7, responsum 68, n. 15). Of a different opinion:Gaill (1595, lib. I, observatio 135, nn.
6-8); Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVIII, De appellationibus, n. 109 circa in medio).
121. Scaccia (1669, glossa 14, quaestio 2, nn. 8, 40). On the matter see Calamandrei (1979, pp.
149-155); Padoa Schioppa (1970, pp. 43-52).
122. Maranta (1568b, pars VI Et demum fertur sententia,  Decisoria iudicii,  tribus membris  distinta:
nempe sententia, appellatione et executione, actus I, n. 155).
123. Zasius (1550, lib. 42, tit.1 De re iudicata, lex 62 Cum quaerebatur, n. 9); Wesenbeck (1658, lib. 42,
tit. 1 De re iudicata et de effectu sententiarum, n. 10); Maranta (1568a, disputatio I An ordinarius loci
ad mandatum delegati a principe tenetur exequi sententiam ipsius delegati evidenter iniustam, et an sibi de
facto resistere, nn. 15-17);Clarus (1607, § finalis, quaestio 94, n. 10); De Marsiliis (1574, § Opportune,
n. 6 circa in medio, n. 10);Menochius (1609, lib. 9, cons. 818, nn. 110); Tuschus (1661, III, conclusio
489, Executio sententiae non retardatur multis casibus, n. 22);Farinacius (1639, pars 3, quaestio 101, n.
111 circa in medio);Brunnemann (1747b, cap. XXVIII, De appellationibus, nn. 110-111); Scaccia (1669,
glossa 14, quaestio 10, n. 30, quaestio 11, nn. 54-69 and quaestio 20 nn. 8-13). In the latter quaestio
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Scaccia affirms that also the unjust res judicata should not be executed even in the case where the
party did not appeal against it. He says that the unjust judgment does not pass in rem judicatam.
He refers the practice in the Papal States and relates that this is also what usually happens in the
courts of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.
124. Gaill A., (1595, lib. I, observatio 127, nn. 9-10).
125. On the matter see Cordero (1985, p. 622).
126. Brunnemann (1752, tomus I, lib. 3, tit.2 De his qui notantur infamia, lex 22 Ictus fustium, nn.
2-6): «Non tamen possum mihi persuadere, quod regulae illae de firmitate rei iudicatae, eo usque
possint  extendi,  ut  etiam  res  iudicata  noceat  corpori  ac  famae,  quae  vitae  aequiparatur
innocentis. Nec lex hanc potestatem dedit judici, ut innocentem infamem facere possit».
ABSTRACTS
In this article the author investigates the errors that can make the judgment null and void and,
therefore, produce the reversal of the res judicata.
She – starting from the definition of res judicata as the irrevocable end of a correctly constructed
judicial proceeding – tries to find out what, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, gives
substance to it in order to better understand the discipline of the miscarriage of justice of the
time.  She  will,  therefore,  see  the  differences  between  final  judgment  and  res  judicata;  the
relationship between appeal and res judicata; the elements which constitute the authority of the
res  judicata;  the  iuris et  de  iure presumption:  res  iudicata  pro  veritate  habetur  which  gives  it
foundation; and the judicial errors made in a criminal judgment that are taken into consideration
by the Italian and German ius commune jurists.
Dans  cet  article  l’auteure  étudie  les erreurs  qui  peuvent  rendre  le  jugement  nul,  et  en
conséquence, produire la rescision de la chose jugée.
À  partir  de  la  définition  de  la  chose  jugée  comme  la  fin  irrévocable  d’un  procès  criminel
correctement  construit,  elle  tente  de  découvrir  ce  qui,  aux  XVIe et  XVII e siècles,  lui  donne
substance afin de mieux comprendre la discipline de l’erreur judiciaire du temps.  Elle verra,
donc, les différences entre le jugement final et la chose jugée; le rapport entre l’appel et la chose
jugée; les éléments qui constituent l’autorité de la chose jugée; la présomption iuris et de iure: res
iudicata pro veritate habetur qui constitue sa base;  et les erreurs judiciaires commises dans un
jugement criminel qui sont prises en compte par les juristes italiens et allemands de ius commune.
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certain aspects of the criminal trial (crime information, res judicata). She published the following
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jurists. A reconstruction of the concept of malus in Sixteenth and Seventeenth century Italian and
German juridical doctrine, Liverpool Law Review (2005, XXVI, 1, pp. 45-73); Bettoni, A., Voci
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